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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, with whom Judges Mansmann, 
Nygaard, Roth, McKee and Ambro join, with whom Judges 
Scirica and Fuentes join as to Part II B, and with whom 
Chief Judge Becker joins in the judgment. 
 
Appellant James W. Riley, a 22 year old black man, was 
sentenced to death on the vote of a Delaware state jury in 
December 1982. If the time intervening between that 
sentence and this court's en banc consideration of the 
matter has been lengthy, it is not because there has been 
undue delay at any stage but because the case raises 
legitimate questions that go to the constitutionality of the 
original trial and sentencing. It was necessary to complete 
a series of proceedings in both state and federal court, none 
of them duplicative, before the case reached this stage. 
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After all, there can be no reconsideration after the 
execution of a death sentence. 
 
I. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
According to testimony at the trial, Riley and Tyrone 
Baxter stopped in a liquor store in Dover, Delaware, on 
February 8, 1982, to get some beer and rob the store. 
Michael Williams waited in the car. Baxter testified that 
Riley, armed with a gun, placed a bottle of beer on the 
counter and announced the store was being robbed. When 
the store owner, James Feeley, a 59 year old white man, 
backed away from the cash register, Baxter grabbed the 
money out of the cash drawer. Riley tried to take Feeley's 
wallet, but Feeley resisted. At Baxter's urging, Riley shot 
Feeley in the leg. Feeley, who was then hopping up and 
down, apparently from the gunshot, said "[Y]ou f 'ing 
niggers." App. at 327. As Riley and Baxter were proceeding 
to the door to leave, Feeley threw a wine bottle that struck 
Riley in the arm. Riley then shot Feeley in the chest, killing 
him. 
 
In May 1982, Riley, Baxter, and Williams were indicted 
on charges of felony murder, intentional murder, first 
degree robbery, possession of a deadly weapon during a 
felony, and second degree conspiracy. Riley pled not guilty 
to all charges. Baxter pled guilty to first degree murder and 
was sentenced to life imprisonment in exchange for his 
testimony against Riley. The murder and weapon charges 
against Williams were also dropped in exchange for his 
testimony against Riley, and he was subsequently convicted 
of the robbery and conspiracy charges. 
 
Riley was represented at trial by appointed counsel, a 
defense-side civil litigator who had never represented a 
criminal defendant in either a murder or a capital case. His 
pretrial motions for co-counsel and funds for a private 
investigator were denied. The prosecutors in Riley's case 
were James Liguori and Mark McNulty. Liguori, the lead 
prosecutor, was a friend and neighbor of Feeley's, and they 
belonged to the same church. 
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The State presented the testimony of Baxter, Williams, 
Baxter's mother (who testified that Riley spent the night 
before the robbery at her house), and a witness who 
reported that Riley's fingerprints were on a bottle of beer in 
the liquor store. In defense, Riley testified that he was in 
Philadelphia on the day of the murder celebrating his 
mother's birthday. However, Riley's mother did not testify in 
support of his alibi. The only witness Riley presented other 
than himself was an inmate at the prison in which Baxter 
was incarcerated, and he testified that Baxter had admitted 
to shooting Feeley. 
 
Riley was tried before and convicted on all counts by an 
all white jury in Kent County Superior Court (the Delaware 
trial court) in December 1982. Four days after the verdict, 
the jury proceeded to consider the penalty. The State 
sought the death penalty, relying only on Riley's felony 
murder conviction and using the underlying robbery as the 
lone aggravating circumstance. Following a two-hour 
penalty hearing, the jury unanimously recommended a 
sentence of death which the court accepted. Riley was also 
sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for 
intentional murder, 20 years imprisonment for robbery, 5 
years imprisonment for possession of a deadly weapon, and 
3 years imprisonment for conspiracy. Riley's attorney 
explained to the trial court that he spent only 14 hours 
preparing for the penalty phase because he had been too 
busy "with the defense and the merits" to spend more time 
building a case in mitigation. App. at 443-444. 
 
Riley appealed his conviction and sentence on numerous 
grounds. In July 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court 
affirmed, see Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997 (Del. 1985) 
(hereafter "Riley I"), and the Supreme Court of the United 
States denied certiorari, see Riley v. Delaware , 478 U.S. 
1022 (1986). 
 
Represented by new counsel, Riley filed a motion for 
post-conviction relief in Kent County Superior Court in 
March 1987 before Judge Bush, the judge who had 
presided at the trial (the "trial judge"), alleging, inter alia, 
that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel and that the prosecution had exercised its 
peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner 
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in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). After 
three days of evidentiary hearings limited to the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, the trial judge denied Riley's 
motion. See State v. Riley, 1988 WL 47076 (Del. Super. 
1988) (hereafter "Riley II"). Riley then requested the 
Superior Court consider reargument on his Batson  claim. 
The trial judge had passed away and Judge Steele of the 
Superior Court ("the hearing judge") granted Riley's request 
for reargument, finding that Riley had established a prima 
facie case of discrimination under Batson . See State v. 
Riley, 1988 WL 130430, at *3 (Del. Super. 1988) (hereafter 
"Riley III"). After holding an evidentiary hearing, the hearing 
judge rejected Riley's Batson claim and all his other claims 
as well. See Riley v. State, No. 200, 1988 (Del. Super. Ct. 
April 21, 1989), App. at 886 (hereafter "Riley IV"). On 
appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court again affirmed, see 
Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719 (Del. 1990) (hereafter "Riley 
V"), and the Supreme Court of the United States again 
denied certiorari, see Riley v. Delaware, 501 U.S. 1223 
(1991). 
 
On August 12, 1991, Riley filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the 
District of Delaware pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254. Again 
Riley obtained new lead counsel, although his post- 
conviction counsel remained as co-counsel. The District 
Court denied Riley's request to amend his petition to add 
two additional claims and then denied his petition without 
an evidentiary hearing. See Riley v. Snyder, 840 F. Supp. 
1012 (D. Del. 1993) (hereafter "Riley VI"). Riley appealed, 
and this court held that the denial of his motion to amend 
was an abuse of discretion and remanded the case so that 
Riley could raise all the issues he sought to raise in an 
amended petition. See Riley v. Taylor, 62 F.3d 86 (3d Cir. 
1995) (hereafter "Riley VII"). 
 
Riley filed his amended habeas petition on August 28, 
1995, alleging 12 grounds for relief. The District Court 
denied Riley's petition without holding an evidentiary 
hearing. See Riley v. Taylor, 1998 WL 172856 (D. Del. Jan. 
16, 1998) (hereafter "Riley VIII"). We then issued a 
certificate of probable cause and Riley appealed, raising 12 
claims. He asserted that: 
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       1.  The State's exercise of peremptory challeng es to 
       strike all prospective black jurors violated the 
       Equal Protection Clause under Batson v. 
       Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 
       2.  The State's continuing conduct in withholdi ng 
       wiretap tapes of a key witness from Riley violated 
       Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
       3.  Riley received ineffective assistance of co unsel 
       because he was prejudiced by trial counsel's 
       deficient performance at the penalty hearing. 
 
       4.  The trial court violated Riley's Sixth and 
       Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying his 
       motions to appoint co-counsel and a private 
       investigator. 
 
       5.  The prosecution and the trial court made 
       improper remarks at the penalty hearing violating 
       the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under 
       Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985). 
 
       6.  The trial court failed to probe equivocal r esponses 
       during the death penalty voir dire in violation of 
       Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
 
       7.  Riley's jury was unconstitutionally biased in favor 
       of returning the death penalty because the trial 
       judge's voir dire failed to identify all prospective 
       jurors who automatically would impose the death 
       penalty. 
 
       8.  Riley was deprived of his constitutional ri ght to a 
       fair and impartial jury because of pretrial 
       publicity. 
 
       9.  The Delaware Supreme Court's proportionalit y 
       review violated Riley's Eighth and Fourteenth 
       Amendment rights. 
 
       10. The trial court's jury instructions failed 
       adequately to guide Riley's jurors on the law, 
       thereby creating a substantial risk that the jurors 
       would impose the death penalty in an arbitrary 
       and capricious manner in violation of both the 
       Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
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       11. The use of felony murder to establish both Riley's 
       eligibility for death and the aggravating 
       circumstance warranting imposition of the death 
       penalty is arbitrary and capricious in violation of 
       the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
 
       12. The District Court abused its discretion in not 
       holding an evidentiary hearing, in denying Riley's 
       motions to conduct discovery and expand the 
       record, and in denying Riley's applications for 
       funds for medical and investigative experts. 
 
A divided panel of this court affirmed. See Riley v. Taylor, 
2001 WL 43597 (3d Cir. 2001) (hereafter "Riley IX"). The 
author of this opinion dissented on two claims, those 
raising Batson and Caldwell violations (claims numbered 1 
and 5 above). On March 5, 2001, the full court granted 
Riley's petition for rehearing en banc, and vacated the 
panel's opinion and judgment. See Riley v. Taylor, 237 F.3d 
348 (3d Cir. 2001). Our order limited the en banc 
proceedings to the District Court's denial of Riley's Batson 
and Caldwell claims. See id. We now reverse and direct the 
District Court to grant the writ of habeas corpus. 1 
 
The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254. We possess appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1291 and 2253. 
 
II. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Riley presents two arguments to the en banc court. He 
argues first, that the prosecution exercised its peremptory 
challenges to strike black jurors in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
second, that the prosecutor's statements to the jury in his 
opening argument at sentencing misled the jury regarding 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Our en banc order vacated the panel opinion and judgment in full. We 
will reinstate the portion of the panel opinion authored by Judge Alito 
that disposed of Riley's ten other claims, and append it hereto as 
Appendix A. 
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its role in the sentencing process in violation of the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. We will address each of these 
arguments in turn. 
 
A. 
 
THE BATSON CLAIM 
 
Riley's claim that the prosecution violated the Equal 
Protection Clause by using its peremptory challenges to 
strike all three prospective black jurors from the jury panel 
because of their race, thereby leaving no black juror sitting 
on the jury, stems from the Supreme Court decision in 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).2 
 
1. Preservation of Claim 
 
The District Court held that Riley was procedurally 
barred from raising his Batson claim in his habeas petition 
because he failed to present that claim to the trial court. 
See Riley VIII, 1998 WL 172856, at *15. We do not agree.3 
The Delaware Supreme Court concluded on Riley's direct 
appeal "that no Sixth Amendment peremptory challenge 
claim was fairly presented to the Trial Court," and also 
held, in the alternate, that Riley's Batson claim failed on 
the merits. Riley I, 496 A.2d at 1010. However, the 
Supreme Court of the United States has since made clear 
that, "[i]f the last state court to be presented with a 
particular federal claim reaches the merits, it removes any 
bar to federal-court review that might otherwise have been 
available." Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991). 
 
In his memorandum opinion granting Riley's motion for a 
post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Although Riley's trial occurred several years before the Batson 
decision, the Supreme Court did not deny certiorari in Riley's direct 
appeal until shortly after Batson was decided, thus entitling Riley to the 
benefit of that decision. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 
(1987); Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1491 n.6 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
3. Much of the discussion of procedural bar is taken from the opinion of 
Judge Alito from the panel opinion that was vacated. See Riley IX, 2001 
WL 43597, at *2-*6. 
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hearing judge stated that he did not think the State 
Supreme Court would maintain its position that Riley had 
failed to timely present a Batson claim. See Riley III, 1988 
WL 130430, at *2 (citing Baynard v. State, 518 A.2d 682 
(Del. 1986)).4 Thereafter, the hearing judge considered and 
rejected Riley's Batson claim on the merits. See Riley IV, 
App. at 887-891. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court 
affirmed the hearing judge's decision, using language that 
expressly refers to the Superior Court's rejection of Riley's 
Batson claim on the merits. See infra note 9. Moreover, in 
that passage, the Delaware Supreme Court expressly 
reaffirmed its holding on direct appeal that the 
prosecution's use of peremptory challenges in this case did 
not violate the state constitution. Not only is there no 
reaffirmation of its prior holding concerning procedural 
default, but there is no reference to that holding, leading us 
to conclude it no longer relied on a procedural bar. See 
Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 266 (1989) (concluding that 
habeas claim was not procedurally barred where state court 
rejected the claim on the merits notwithstanding its 
observation that allegations "could have been raised [on] 
direct appeal"). 
 
If the Delaware Supreme Court had continued to believe 
at the time of its most recent decision that Riley's Batson 
claim was foreclosed for failure to make a proper objection 
at the time of trial, it seems likely that the Court would 
have made that point expressly, instead of affirming the 
hearing judge's findings on the merits. Indeed, it is unlikely 
that it would have made no comment on the hearing 
judge's failure to follow its earlier decision on foreclosure. 
Thus, we interpret the decision of the Delaware Supreme 
Court in Riley V (its most recent) to be a rejection of Riley's 
Batson claim on the merits. Accordingly, Riley's Batson 
claim is not procedurally barred and we proceed to examine 
its merits. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In Baynard, the Court held that the defendant sufficiently raised an 
objection to the State's peremptory challenges which resulted in an all 
white jury being impaneled where defendant "noted the race of each 
black against whom the State exercised a peremptory challenge," "moved 
the Court to refuse the peremptory challenges against two of the drawn 
black jurors and moved to quash the entire panel at the end of the jury 
selection process." 518 A.2d at 687. 
 
                                9 
  
2. Batson v. Kentucky 
 
In Batson, the Supreme Court reiterated the well-settled 
principle that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits 
discrimination on account of race in selection of both the 
venire and the petit jury. See 476 U.S. at 88. This principle, 
which dates back at least as far as Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), recognizes that racial 
discrimination in the selection of jurors harms"not only the 
accused whose life or liberty they are summoned to try," 
but also harms the potential juror, whose race "is unrelated 
to his fitness as a juror." Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (quotation 
omitted). As the Court noted in Batson,"[s]election 
procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from 
juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our 
system of justice." Id. 
 
The Court granted certiorari in Batson so that it could 
reexamine the evidentiary burden its opinion in Swain v. 
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), had placed on a criminal 
defendant who alleged that the State improperly used its 
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on race. In 
Swain, the Court had held that a defendant could satisfy a 
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing 
that a prosecutor, "in case after case, whatever the 
circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the 
defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the 
removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified 
jurors by the jury commissioners and who have survived 
challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever 
serve on petit juries." Id. at 223. The Batson Court noted 
that many lower courts interpreted Swain to hold "that 
proof of repeated striking of blacks over a number of cases 
was necessary to establish a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause." Batson, 476 U.S. at 92. The Court in 
Batson recognized that this standard had "placed on 
defendants a crippling burden of proof " that resulted in 
"prosecutors' peremptory challenges [becoming] largely 
immune from constitutional scrutiny." Id. at 92-93 (footnote 
omitted). Accordingly, it rejected the Swain evidentiary 
formulation. 
 
In the jurisprudence that has evolved following Batson, 
the inquiry has been characterized as a three-step one. 
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Batson stated that "a defendant may establish a prima facie 
case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit 
jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise 
of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial." Id. at 96. 
Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing of racial 
discrimination (step one), the prosecution must articulate a 
race-neutral explanation for its use of peremptory 
challenges (step two). If it does so, the trial court must 
determine whether the defendant has established 
purposeful discrimination (step three). See id.  at 96-98; 
Simmons v. Beyer, 44 F.3d 1160, 1167 (3d Cir. 1995); 
Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1492 (3d Cir. 1994). The 
ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation 
rests with, and does not shift from, the defendant. See 
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). 
 
3. Riley's Batson Challenge in State Court 
 
In this case, the hearing judge determined, and the State 
does not contest, that Riley made out a prima facie case of 
discrimination in jury selection, as the State had used its 
peremptory challenges to strike all three prospective black 
jurors from the venire, "result[ing] in an all-white jury 
sitting on a first degree murder trial involving a black 
defendant and a white victim." Riley III, 1988 WL 130430, 
at *2. The hearing judge then conducted an evidentiary 
hearing. The State proceeded to step two of the Batson 
inquiry by offering race-neutral justifications for its use of 
the peremptory challenges to strike Ray Nichols, Lois 
Beecher, and Charles McGuire, each of whom was black. 
 
Liguori, the lead prosecutor at trial and the State's 
principal witness at the post-conviction relief hearing, 
testified that the State "wanted to have minority 
representation on the jury panel." App. at 792-793. He 
stated that he wanted jurors who would be attentive and 
who would vote for a death sentence. He testified that he 
wanted "to make sure we were not only going to get a 
conviction of murder in the first degree, but also the death 
penalty." App. at 797. 
 
With respect to Nichols, Liguori remembered clearly that 
"Mr. Nichols was an individual who, and unfortunately the 
record doesn't reflect this, who was not, in my particular 
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mind, not certain with regard to being able to return a 
verdict for death." App. at 797-798 (emphasis added). As 
Liguori explained, "there was a pause and a significant 
pause in [Nichols'] answering [the court's] inquiry [at voir 
dire] and that to me was enough to suggest that he might 
not be able to return a death penalty and I didn't want 
anyone that wasn't going to give me a death penalty." App. 
at 798-799. 
 
With regard to Beecher, Liguori testified that he struck 
her because of her response to the court that she did not 
think she could impose the death penalty. App. at 804. 
 
As for McGuire, Liguori explained that he used the 
peremptory challenge because he presumed McGuire would 
be unable to "give his full time and attention" to the trial. 
App. at 801. According to Liguori, 
 
       Mr. McGuire was an individual who had requested-- 
       remember, this was going to be around Christmas also. 
 
       Mr. McGuire had previously requested to be excused 
       from jury service. When Mr. McGuire came up, the first 
       thing I wanted to make clear--as I said earlier, I 
       wanted someone that was going to be attentive and you 
       can read all the books you want with regard to 
       selecting prospective jurors and it is always make sure 
       you have attentive jurors, people not concerned about 
       getting home early to take care of their kids, or 
       vacation. 
 
       Mr. McGuire himself had requested the Court to 
       excuse him. The Court didn't. When he went through 
       his inquiry, we asked the judge to excuse him for 
       cause. The judge said no. It then left us with no 
       alternative but to think he would not give his full time 
       and attention and therefore we struck Mr. McGuire. 
 
App. at 801. 
 
On cross-examination of Liguori, Riley's attorney 
introduced Liguori's handwritten notes from voir dire. 
Written next to McGuire's name was the word "Out." App. 
at 832. Among the names on the same page was that of 
Charles Reed, a white man who actually served on Riley's 
jury. Next to Reed's name on the sheet was written,"works 
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Lowe's, wants off." App. at 823. Despite repeated efforts by 
Riley's counsel to refresh Liguori's recollection, Liguori 
testified that he had no recollection of Reed whatsoever. 
Liguori agreed, however, that the notation next to Reed's 
name indicated that Reed had requested to be excused from 
service on the jury. Liguori offered no explanation for his 
decision not to strike Reed. 
 
Riley then presented McGuire as a witness at the state 
post-conviction hearing. McGuire testified that, in contrast 
to Liguori's testimony, he had never asked to be excused 
from the jury. McGuire specifically denied ever indicating to 
either the prosecutors or the court that he was unwilling to 
serve on the jury or that he wanted to be excused. Instead, 
he testified that his supervisor had told him that he was 
going to make a "formal request" that McGuire be excused 
and that his supervisor did send a letter to the trial judge 
requesting he be relieved from jury duty. App. at 860. 
According to McGuire, in response to his supervisor's letter, 
he was questioned by the trial judge whom he advised of 
his willingness to serve on the jury. App. at 849-850. 
 
Riley also presented evidence that in addition to the 
prosecutor's striking of the three prospective black jurors in 
his trial, the Kent County Prosecutor's office used its 
peremptory challenges to remove every prospective black 
juror in the three other first degree murder trials that 
occurred within a year of his trial.5 Counsel for the State 
objected to the admission of this evidence, arguing that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The three other trials were: 
 
       a. Andre Deputy--state struck the lone prospective black juror, a 
       second juror designated as "Indian," and six prospective white 
       jurors; 
 
       b. Judith McBride--state struck all three prospective black jurors, 
       five whites, plus two other jurors whose race has not been 
       identified; and 
 
       c. Daniel Pregent--state struck the lone prospective black juror 
       and four whites. 
 
Although the race of two of the jurors who were ultimately impaneled 
has not been identified, the State does not contest Riley's assertion that 
every impaneled juror was white. 
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evidence of general prosecutorial practices was relevant 
only to Riley's prima facie case. The hearing judge rejected 
this argument and admitted the evidence, explaining that it 
was being offered to show that "the exercise of the 
peremptory challenges in this particular case followed some 
kind of pattern that exists in the prosecutorial actions in 
first degree murder cases involving minority defendants and 
it is not segregable or severable from past history." App. at 
872. 
 
Counsel for the State then requested and received an 
additional four weeks in which to "attempt to prepare the 
same sort of information which . . . would be contrary to 
the representations made by [Riley's counsel's] 
information." App. at 874. He informed the court that he 
had not yet been able to obtain materials from other cases, 
but he assured the court that "they do exist." App. at 874. 
Yet approximately one month after the hearing, the State 
advised the hearing judge by a letter dated January 27, 
1989 from Jeffrey M. Taschner, Deputy Attorney General, 
that stated in full: "Please be advised that the State will not 
supplement the record of the post conviction relief hearing 
held in the above-captioned matter on December 30, 1988." 
Letter to this Court from Thomas J. Allingham II (Dec. 16, 
1999), Ex. B (on file in the Clerk's office). 
 
The hearing judge ultimately accepted the State's race- 
neutral explanations and rejected Riley's Batson  claim, 
without mentioning any of the evidence introduced by Riley 
at the hearing. See Riley IV, App. at 887-891. The Delaware 
Supreme Court affirmed, likewise without discussion of 
Riley's evidence. See Riley V, 585 A.2d at 725. 
 
4. Standard of Review 
 
A Batson claim presents mixed questions of law and fact. 
See Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960, 965 (3d Cir. 1993). We 
exercise plenary review over questions of law and we look to 
28 U.S.C. S 2254 for our standard of review of findings of 
fact. See id. Riley's federal habeas petition was filed before 
the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act ("AEDPA") of 1996, 110 Stat. 1214, and 
therefore AEDPA does not govern our standard of review. 
See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Instead, under 
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the federal habeas statute in effect at the time Riley filed 
his petition, we must presume correct the state court's 
findings of fact unless one of the statutory exceptions 
applies. See 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) (1988). 
 
The District Court rejected Riley's Batson claim on the 
merits by relying on this presumption of correctness. See 
Riley VIII, 1998 WL 172856, at *17. Riley contends that the 
presumption of correctness is not warranted because the 
hearing judge's factual findings are "not fairly supported by 
the record," 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(8) (1988), and because he 
"did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the 
State court proceeding," 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(6) (1988). 
Because we resolve Riley's appeal pursuant to S 2254(d)(8), 
we need not consider Riley's latter argument. 
 
The limited nature of review underlying the requirement 
that a federal court must defer to the state court findings 
of fact if they are "fairly supported by the record" reflects 
important policy considerations. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 
474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (presumption of correctness 
recognizes that "as a matter of the sound administration of 
justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another 
to decide the issue"). In Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 122 
n.6 (1983), the Court stated that "28 U.S.C.S 2254(d) 
requires that a federal habeas court more than simply 
disagree with the state court before rejecting its factual 
determinations." The Court further noted that the statutory 
test set forth in S 2254(d)(8) "is satisfied by the existence of 
probative evidence underlying the [state court's] 
conclusion." Id. 
 
In the instant case, it appears that the hearing judge's 
factual findings were based primarily on determinations 
regarding the credibility of Liguori at the post-conviction 
hearing. Such findings are generally owed "even greater 
deference" because "only the trial judge can be aware of the 
variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so 
heavily on the listener's understanding of and belief in what 
is said." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City , 470 U.S. 564, 
575 (1985); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 ("Since 
the trial judge's findings in [this] context .. . largely will 
turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court 
ordinarily should give those findings great deference."). 
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Still, this does not signify that "federal review. . . is a 
nullity." Caldwell v. Maloney, 159 F.3d 639, 651 (1st Cir. 
1998) (hereafter "Maloney"). In Purkett, the Supreme Court 
stated that "implausible or fantastic justifications may (and 
probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful 
discrimination." 514 U.S. at 768. In addition, the Supreme 
Court has suggested, albeit in a non-habeas context, that 
reviewing courts need not accept a trial judge's findings 
based on credibility determinations if the witness has not 
told a "coherent and facially plausible story" or if his story 
is "contradicted by extrinsic evidence." Anderson, 470 U.S. 
at 575. Thus, we must determine whether there is fair 
support to conclude that the State put forth "a coherent 
and facially plausible" explanation of its strikes of the 
prospective black jurors or whether the State's explanations 
are "implausible." Ultimately, when we review the record at 
step three of the Batson inquiry, we must decide whether 
the state courts' acceptance of the State's explanation has 
been made after consideration of all the evidence on the 
record. 
 
5. State's Race-Neutral Explanations 
 
At the post-conviction hearing, the State proceeded to 
step two of the Batson inquiry by offering race-neutral 
reasons for striking the black jurors. It did so primarily 
through Liguori's testimony. Riley does not argue that the 
State failed to meet its step two burden. His contention is 
that the state courts failed to engage in the step three 
inquiry, which requires evaluation of the proffered race- 
neutral reasons in light of all the other evidence in the 
record. 
 
Liguori contended he struck Nichols because he doubted 
whether Nichols would be willing to return a death 
sentence. He based this doubt on his clear recollection of "a 
significant pause" by Nichols when asked about the death 
penalty. App. at 798. Yet, as Liguori himself admitted in his 
testimony, the record reflects no such pause and no such 
uncertainty on Nichols' part. 
 
At voir dire, Nichols had answered the two questions 
posed by the court regarding the jurors' willingness to 
sentence a defendant to death in a manner seemingly 
favorable to the prosecution: 
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       Q: Do you have any conscientious scruples against 
       finding a verdict of guilty where the punishment might 
       be death or against imposing the death penalty even if 
       the evidence should so warrant? 
 
       A: No. 
 
       Q: Regardless of any personal beliefs or feelings that 
       you may have, if the evidence justified it, would you be 
       able to find a person guilty of murder in the first 
       degree and would you be able to impose the death 
       penalty. 
 
       A: I think so. 
 
App. at 226-227. A prospective white juror, Angelo LePore, 
provided the exact same answers to the court's questions, 
yet he was not stricken and actually served on Riley's jury. 
App. at 231-232. The record provides no basis for 
distinguishing Nichols from LePore. 
 
Moreover, despite Nichols' alleged pause, the prosecutors 
did not ask the trial court to remove Nichols for cause or to 
inquire further into his willingness to award the death 
penalty, even though the trial judge excused six 
venirepersons for cause because they said they couldn't, or 
believed they couldn't, impose the death penalty, App. at 
234-237, 245-246, 265-271, and two more who responded 
equivocally, App. at 273-276, 282-286. This raises the 
question why, if Nichols actually did pause "a significant 
pause," the State did not seek to have him removed for 
cause like the others. The record does not show (and the 
State does not claim) that the prosecutors ever expressed to 
the trial court the concern that Nichols would be unwilling 
to impose the death penalty, that the court independently 
expressed concern, or that any of the contemporaneous 
notes kept by the prosecutors as to some of the jurors 
reflected either the existence of a pause or the concern 
about which Liguori testified six years later. Thus, Liguori's 
explanation is entirely unsupported by the record. See 
Johnson v. Vasquez, 3 F.3d 1327, 1331 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(stating that courts are not bound to accept race-neutral 
reasons that are either unsupported by the record or 
refuted by it). 
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Similarly, the record offers little basis for distinguishing 
McGuire, a prospective black juror who was struck, from 
Reed, a white juror who served without challenge by the 
State. Liguori testified that he struck McGuire because 
McGuire asked to be excused from jury service and he 
feared that McGuire would be an inattentive juror. 6 Liguori, 
who claimed to remember Nichols' pause six years later 
without benefit of any assistance, testified that he had no 
recollection at all regarding Reed. Liguori's notes from voir 
dire, however, state that Reed "works Lowe's, wants off," 
App. at 823, which strongly suggests that Reed too was 
likely to be an inattentive juror. Yet at no point during voir 
dire did the prosecution ever express any concern over 
Reed's place on the jury. Based on this record evidence, 
there is no basis for distinguishing between McGuire's 
desire to be excused and Reed's desire to be excused. 
 
Although the State strains to distinguish the two jurors 
by arguing that McGuire's desire to be excused from jury 
service was stronger than Reed's desire because McGuire's 
employer had intervened to seek his release, its effort is not 
persuasive. First, Liguori did not testify before the hearing 
judge that this was the basis for the strike; in fact, Liguori 
testified to the opposite -- that McGuire himself had asked 
to be excused from jury service. Second, even if McGuire 
would have been inattentive for work-related reasons, the 
prosecution's notes from voir dire connecting Reed's 
employment to his "wants off " suggest that Reed's desire to 
be excused from jury service may have been work-related 
as well. Third, there is no evidence in the record to suggest 
that a juror will be more inattentive because s/he wants to 
be off the jury for work-related reasons rather than for 
other reasons, which is the basis for the State's position 
that McGuire's desire to be excused was stronger than 
Reed's desire to "want[ ] off," documented in Liguori's 
contemporaneous notes. 
 
With regard to both Nichols and McGuire, the state 
courts failed to mention in their opinions the weaknesses in 
the State's explanations, and therefore failed to complete 
the required step three Batson inquiry. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In fact, McGuire testified at the post-conviction hearing that he never 
asked to be excused from the jury. 
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6. Statistical Evidence 
 
In addition to Riley's challenge to the State's explanations 
at the post-conviction hearing for striking Nichols and 
McGuire by pointing to inconsistencies in the record, Riley 
introduced evidence that the prosecution used its 
peremptory challenges to strike every prospective black 
juror in the three other first degree murder trials occurring 
in Kent County within one year of Riley's trial. It did so 
both for the other black murder defendant and the two 
white murder defendants.7 In these four trials (including 
Riley's), the prosecution struck all 8 prospective black 
jurors who were called, i.e., 100%. By contrast, the 
prosecution used its peremptory challenges to strike only 
23 of the 71 prospective white jurors, or 32%. After the 
prosecution used its peremptory challenges to strike 23 
whites, 8 blacks, 1 Indian, and 2 jurors of unidentified 
race, the remaining racial makeup of the actual jurors in 
the four trials was 48 white jurors. See Letter to this Court 
from Thomas J. Allingham II (Dec. 16, 1999), Ex. A (on file 
in the Clerk's office). 
 
An amateur with a pocket calculator can calculate the 
number of blacks that would have served had the State 
used its strikes in a racially proportionate manner. In the 
four capital cases there was a total of 82 potential jurors on 
the venires who were not removed for cause, of whom eight, 
or 9.76%, were black. If the prosecution had used its 
peremptory challenges in a manner proportional to the 
percentage of blacks in the overall venire, then only 3 of the 
34 jurors peremptorily struck (8.82%) would have been 
black and 5 of the 48 actual jurors (10.42%) would have 
been black. Instead, none of the 48 jurors were black. 
 
Admittedly, there was no statistical analysis of these 
figures presented by either side in the post-conviction 
proceeding. But is it really necessary to have a 
sophisticated analysis by a statistician to conclude that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The exclusion by the Kent County prosecutor of all black jurors in the 
trials of the two white defendants is relevant to establishing a pattern 
of 
race-based use of peremptories. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) 
(excluding jurors on the basis of race is unconstitutional regardless of 
the race of the defendant). 
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there is little chance of randomly selecting four consecutive 
all white juries? The State never argued before the hearing 
judge and does not argue before this court that the 
selection of four consecutive all white juries could have 
been due to pure chance. Nor does it suggest that Riley's 
evidence does not accurately represent Kent County 
prosecutorial practices. Moreover, not once has the State 
offered an explanation for its use of peremptory challenges 
to strike all prospective black jurors in the four consecutive 
capital cases. The State has never sought to explain the 
data by variables other than race. Nor has it sought to 
rebut Riley's evidence. 
 
The failure of the State to produce evidence from other 
trials is significant because it was the State, not Riley, that 
would have had access to such evidence, it was the State 
that asserted that such evidence was available and 
forthcoming, and it was the State, not Riley, that failed to 
provide it. Yet again, neither the hearing judge in his 
opinion nor the Delaware Supreme Court discussed Riley's 
evidence that showed the systematic exclusion of blacks 
from the petit juries in Delaware. In fact, having stated that 
this evidence was introduced to demonstrate that"the 
exercise of the peremptory challenges in this particular case 
followed some kind of pattern that exists in the 
prosecutorial actions in first degree murder cases involving 
minority defendants," App. at 872, the hearing judge 
discussed neither the statistics nor the State's failure to 
explain them. Thus, once again by overlooking and ignoring 
a significant segment of Riley's evidence, the hearing 
judge's opinion does not satisfy the crucial third step of the 
Batson analysis. 
 
7. Analysis 
 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary post-conviction 
hearing, the hearing judge issued a written opinion in 
which he addressed the prosecutors' reasons for striking 
the three black jurors, as required by step three of the 
Batson inquiry. He stated: 
 
       The State in this case provided race-neutral 
       explanations for the peremptory challenges on all three 
       black jurors. After examining the demeanor and 
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       credibility of the witnesses and prosecutors at the 
       evidentiary hearing, I believe the State exercised its 
       peremptory challenges entirely within the strictures of 
       the Fourteenth Amendment. No factual basis exists for 
       a successful claim of an equal protection violation. The 
       State successfully rebutted any prima facie showing of 
       discrimination in jury selection based upon race. 
 
Riley IV, App. at 890-891. This determination that the 
prosecutors did not intend to discriminate on the basis of 
race in exercising their peremptory strikes against the three 
challenged jurors is a factual finding entitled to a 
presumption of correctness unless one of the exceptions in 
S 2254(d) (1988) applies. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 
U.S. 352, 365-66 (1991). 
 
The inquiry required by Batson must be focused on the 
distinctions actually offered by the State in the state court, 
not on all possible distinctions we can hypothesize. See 
Mahaffey v. Page, 162 F.3d 481, 483 n.1 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(concerning itself with actual reasons, not apparent ones, 
for state's use of peremptory challenges); Turner v. 
Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248, 1253 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The 
arguments that the State has made since the evidentiary 
hearing do not form part of the prosecutor's explanation."). 
Apparent or potential reasons do not shed any light on the 
prosecutor's intent or state of mind when making the 
peremptory challenge. As to both Nichols and McGuire, the 
hearing judge merely repeated Liguori's articulated 
explanations without any reference to, or analysis of, Riley's 
evidence of pretext and seems to have accepted the State's 
justifications at face value. 
 
Liguori simply testified that he struck McGuire because 
he would be inattentive at trial, and for no other reason, a 
justification that would apply equally to Reed. The State 
gave no explanation as to Reed other than Liguori's plain 
lack of memory. Cf. Harrison v. Ryan, 909 F.2d 84, 87 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (concluding that prosecutor's failure to recall his 
reason for striking prospective juror did not constitute a 
race-neutral explanation). And the credibility of Liguori's 
lack of memory is somewhat in doubt considering that he 
claimed to remember Nichols' "significant pause." The only 
distinction between the two jurors that is apparent from the 
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record is that McGuire, who was struck, is black; Reed, 
who was retained, is white. 
 
A comparison between a stricken black juror and a 
sitting white juror is relevant to determining whether the 
prosecution's asserted justification for striking the black 
juror is pretextual. See McClain v. Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209, 
1220 (9th Cir. 2000) ("A prosecutor's motives may be 
revealed as pretextual where a given explanation is equally 
applicable to a juror of a different race who was not 
stricken by the exercise of a peremptory challenge."); 
Jordan v. Lefevre, 206 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2000) 
("Support for the notion that there was purposeful 
discrimination in the peremptory challenge may lie in the 
similarity between the characteristics of jurors struck and 
jurors accepted. Where the principal difference between 
them is race, the credibility of the prosecutor's explanation 
is much weakened."); Maloney, 159 F.3d at 653 ("[A]s a 
general matter, comparisons between challenged jurors and 
similarly situated, unchallenged jurors of a different race or 
gender can be probative of whether a peremptory challenge 
is racially motivated."); Coulter v. Gilmore , 155 F.3d 912, 
921 (7th Cir. 1998) ("A facially neutral reason for striking a 
juror may show discrimination if that reason is invoked 
only to eliminate African-American prospective jurors and 
not others who also have that characteristic."); Turner, 121 
F.3d at 1251-52 ("A comparative analysis of jurors struck 
and those remaining is a well-established tool for exploring 
the possibility that facially race-neutral reasons are a 
pretext for discrimination."). 
 
The comparison between McGuire and Reed is strongly 
suggestive of the State's race-based use of its peremptory 
challenges. See, e.g., McClain, 217 F.3d at 1224 (concluding 
that Batson was violated where two of six proffered race- 
neutral explanations were "pretextual based upon 
comparisons of voir dire responses by non-black jurors who 
were seated without objection by the prosecutor," and other 
four were contrary to the facts); Turner, 121 F.3d at 1253- 
54 (holding that the district court clearly erred in finding 
that prosecutor did not discriminate in jury selection where 
sole justification offered for striking a black juror applied 
equally to non-stricken white juror); Devose v. Norris, 53 
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F.3d 201, 205 (8th Cir. 1995) (concluding that Batson was 
violated where the only justification prosecutor offered for 
striking three out of four prospective black jurors with prior 
jury experience was that they might be "burned out" by 
prior service and where at least five white jurors were not 
stricken although they had previously served on juries); 
Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting the 
prosecutor's proffered race-neutral explanation for striking 
black jurors where the prosecutor did not apply the same 
rationale to similarly-situated white jurors); Garrett v. 
Morris, 815 F.2d 509, 514 (8th Cir. 1987) ("The prosecutor's 
rationale [for striking three black jurors]-- the blacks' 
purported lack of education, background, and knowledge -- 
seems clearly pretextual in light of his decision not to strike 
white jurors who differed in no significant way"). 
 
Nichols' answers as to his willingness to return a death 
sentence were the same as LePore's, and were it not for 
Liguori's testimony as to the suspect "significant pause," 
there would be no significant difference between them as 
well, except, of course, that Nichols, who was struck, is 
black and LePore, who was retained, is white. 
 
Furthermore, each piece of evidence should not be 
reviewed in isolation. It is clear that "[a]n explanation for a 
particular challenge need not necessarily be pigeon-holed 
as wholly acceptable or wholly unacceptable. The relative 
plausibility or implausibility of each explanation for a 
particular challenge . . . may strengthen or weaken the 
assessment of the prosecution's explanation as to other 
challenges." United States v. Alvarado, 923 F.2d 253, 256 
(2d Cir. 1991). In short, "[a] reviewing court's level of 
suspicion may . . . be raised by a series of very weak 
explanations for a prosecutor's peremptory challenges. The 
whole may be greater than the sum of its parts." Maloney, 
159 F.3d at 651. 
 
It is in this connection that we must turn to the 
statistical evidence presented by Riley of the pattern of the 
State's use of its peremptories. It may be that such 
evidence, standing alone, would not be sufficient to show 
intentional discrimination in selection of juries by the Kent 
County Prosecutor's office in the year in question. It is, 
however, particularly troublesome because the State failed 
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to provide the rebuttal data as to Riley's evidence when 
given the opportunity which it requested. In that 
circumstance, an inference adverse to the State may fairly 
be drawn. As has been recognized, "[w]here relevant 
information . . . is in the possession of one party and not 
provided, then an adverse inference may be drawn that 
such information would be harmful to the party who fails to 
provide it." McMahan & Co. v. Po Folks, Inc. , 206 F.3d 627, 
632 (6th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has stated, "The production of weak 
evidence when strong is available can lead only to the 
conclusion that the strong would have been adverse." 
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 
(1939). Accordingly, the State must accept the negative 
inference that flows from its failure to provide the rebuttal 
data, and that inescapable inference is that the Kent 
County Prosecutor's office did not want blacks on its juries 
in first degree murder cases. 
 
The Supreme Court in Batson recognized the significance 
of evidence of systematic exclusion of blacks in jury 
selection. It stated, "Proof of systematic exclusion from the 
venire raises an inference of purposeful discrimination 
because the `result bespeaks discrimination.' " Batson, 476 
U.S. at 94-95 (quoting Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 
482 (1954)). It likewise recognized the relevance of 
systematic exclusion of blacks from the petit jury. See id. at 
96-97; see also McClain, 217 F.3d at 1224 (finding that "the 
fact that all blacks in the venire pool were struck raises an 
inference of discrimination" where 3 of 39 people in venire 
pool were black). On the record before us, it is difficult to 
avoid drawing the inference that the Kent County 
Prosecutor followed a pattern of using peremptory 
challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. 8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The pattern is relevant even if Riley has not undertaken to prove a 
Batson violation in the other three trials. Defendants Daniel Pregent and 
Judith McBride were both tried before Batson was decided, and thus 
were not likely to have raised a Batson objection, particularly since 
neither was black and the Supreme Court did not extend the Batson 
holding to apply regardless of whether the defendant and excluded juror 
were of the same race until its opinion in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 
(1991). The third capital defendant, Deputy, did not challenge the 
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Despite the State's efforts to explain away the various 
parts of the evidentiary picture Riley has presented, the 
record as a whole squarely contradicts its position. The 
questionable nature of Liguori's explanations for the strikes 
of McGuire and Nichols must be evaluated not only in light 
of the uncontested evidence of the use of peremptory 
strikes in Kent County but also in light of the nature of the 
State's pre-Batson defense on direct appeal. 
 
When Riley's direct appeal came before the Delaware 
Supreme Court in 1984, the State justified the use of race 
in selecting jurors in criminal trials. On that occasion, 
which was the State's first opportunity to defend the use of 
its peremptory challenges in Riley's trial, the State did not 
offer a single race-neutral explanation, not even as an 
alternate argument; instead, it claimed that it was 
permissible -- even socially desirable -- to exclude jurors 
based on what it called "group association," App. at 896, 
which a Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court was 
reported to have recognized as a "euphemism for race," 
App. at 1321. In its brief to the Delaware Supreme Court, 
the State interpreted Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 
(1965), as "recogniz[ing] how peremptory challenges, even 
those exercised on the basis of group association, foster the 
constitutional goal of an impartial jury." App. at 896. The 
State added in a footnote that it "emphatically denies that 
the prosecutor [in Riley's case] exercised any of his 
challenges solely on the assumption that the juror's race, in 
the context of the facts of this case, indicated a verdict 
position adverse to the prosecution. Rather, the State will 
argue that even if such was the case, no constitutional 
command would have been contravened." App. at 896 
(emphasis added). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
composition of the jury in the state courts and thus the racial makeup 
of the venire was not available when this court decided the appeal. See 
Deputy, 19 F.3d at 1491-93. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Batson 
made clear that "a defendant may make a prima facie showing of 
purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire by relying 
solely on the facts concerning its selection in his case." Batson, 486 
U.S. 
at 95 (emphasis in original). 
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Before this court, the State contends that Swain  was 
"good law" at the time, so reliance on that case cannot be 
viewed as a concession that some of its peremptory 
challenges may not have been race-neutral. Tr. of Oral 
Argument at 31. Yet, significant for purposes here is that in 
response to Riley's challenge to its use of peremptories, the 
State never denied on direct appeal that race played a role 
in its use of peremptory challenges; it only claimed that it 
did not exercise them solely based on race. Its justification 
for that practice certainly suggests that race was at least a 
partial basis for its use of peremptory challenges. And that 
suggestion further supports the conclusion we are led to by 
our earlier analysis of the record that the State's proffered 
race-neutral explanations are pretextual. 
 
The requirement that we defer to the State's findings of 
fact does not apply when those findings are not supported 
by probative evidence. The State's position is that under 
S 2254(d) "all that is required" is that the state court make 
findings of fact, and flatly states that because the hearing 
judge did so, we must defer. Tr. of Oral Argument at 41. 
Although the State concedes that we must concern 
ourselves under Rushen, 464 U.S. at 121 n.6, with whether 
there is probative evidence in the record to support the 
state court's findings, it then seems to argue that since the 
findings are primarily based on credibility determinations, 
the mere fact that Liguori testified is sufficiently probative 
to support these determinations. 
 
Certainly it is not required that a federal court should 
defer to a state court's findings of fact on habeas review as 
long as the state court accepted the prosecutor's race- 
neutral explanation, no matter how incredible, 
contradicted, and implausible it may be. On the contrary, 
several courts of appeals have acknowledged that the 
traditional level of deference should not govern appellate 
review when a prosecutor's explanations are obviously not 
credible. See McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221 (" `[I]mplausible or 
fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to 
be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.' ") (quoting 
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768); United States v. Griffin, 194 F.3d 
808, 826 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that a basis for reversal of 
state court exists where "the reason given [by the 
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prosecutor] is completely outlandish or there is other 
evidence which demonstrated its falsity"); Maloney, 159 
F.3d at 651 (stating that serious questions of pretext arise 
when the facts in the record are "objectively contrary to" the 
prosecutor's explanations). 
 
In light of the lack of probative evidence in the record to 
support the findings that the State exercised its peremptory 
challenges at Riley's trial in a race-neutral manner, we 
decline to give these findings deference. Such deference is 
ordinarily based, at least in part, on the original trial 
court's ability to make contemporaneous assessments. See 
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. at 365. Recently, the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit deferred to the state 
court's findings on a Batson claim precisely because the 
court had that opportunity. It explained, 
 
       Indeed, it would be an impermissible exercise in 
       hindsight for us now to upset the trial court's 
       credibility determination in evaluating the prosecutor's 
       explanation. And as the district court correctly 
       observed, the `retrospective parsing of the `curricula 
       vitae' of the jurors' is no substitute for the observations 
       of the trial judge, who witnessed first-hand the 
       process. We simply cannot overlook the fact that the 
       trial court had conducted an extensive voir dire of the 
       jury pool, which was documented in several hundred 
       pages of trial transcripts, and was able to observe the 
       demeanor and hear the responses of the prospective 
       jurors in court. This insight enabled the trial court to 
       compare the prosecutor's explanation with what 
       occurred at the bench and in open court. Most 
       significantly, the trial court was able to observe the 
       prosecutor's demeanor and conduct and evaluate the 
       credibility of his explanation. 
 
Evans v. Smith, 220 F.3d 306, 316 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(emphases added). 
 
It may be that because the findings at issue here were 
made by the hearing judge six years after the State had 
exercised its peremptory challenges before the trial judge 
and the hearing judge neither witnessed the challenges 
first-hand nor examined the witnesses at the time the 
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challenges were exercised, he did not note or comment on 
some of the troublesome inconsistencies in the State's race- 
neutral explanations. 
 
Deference in a Batson case must be viewed in the context 
of the requirement that the state courts engage in the 
three-step Batson inquiry. As the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit described step three: "If [the State's] burden 
[under step two] is met, the court then addresses and 
evaluates all evidence introduced by each side (including all 
evidence introduced in the first and second steps) that 
tends to show that race was or was not the real reason and 
determines whether the defendant has met his burden of 
persuasion." McMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 953 n.4 (4th Cir. 
1994); see also Jordan, 206 F.3d at 200 (stating that step 
three of Batson inquiry requires examination of "all the 
facts and circumstances") (quotation omitted). 
 
Here, the state courts failed to examine all of the 
evidence to determine whether the State's proffered race- 
neutral explanations were pretextual. Not only is there no 
indication on the record that the hearing judge engaged in 
the required analysis, but there is no indication that the 
Delaware Supreme Court did so, by making findings which 
also would have been entitled to deference. See Sumner v. 
Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981). The omission of the crucial 
step of evaluating the State's proffered explanations in light 
of all the evidence can be gleaned by the absence of the 
word "pretext" in both the opinion of the hearing judge and 
in the opinion of the Delaware Supreme Court. Nor is there 
any language in either opinion that suggests, whatever the 
words used, that either court recognized the nature of the 
analysis it was required to undertake. In Jones v. Ryan, we 
noted that the state court decision rejecting a Batson claim 
contained no factual findings relating to the different 
prongs of the Batson analysis, to which we could accord a 
presumption of correctness. See 987 F.2d at 965-66. The 
situation before us is similar. 
 
The State argues that our concern with the hearing 
judge's failure to discuss critical evidence in his decision is 
merely a complaint about the manner in which he wrote his 
opinion. It states in its supplemental brief that"[i]t may 
well have been better for the state judge to have further 
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explained his decision . . . [b]ut the federal habeas statutes 
do not set standards for the writing of opinions by state 
judges." Supp. Memo. of Appellees at 7. 
 
But the concern is not how the decision was written, a 
trifling matter. It is the failure of the state courts to 
complete the required Batson analysis by comparing the 
stricken black jurors with the sitting white jurors, 
acknowledging the statistical evidence of striking all black 
jurors in capital murder cases in Kent County within a year 
of Riley's trial, and recognizing the State's position in this 
very case that use of peremptories for racial reasons was 
both constitutional and socially beneficial. 
 
Comparable to the case before us is the decision in 
Coulter v. Gilmore, 155 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 1998). There the 
court acknowledged that deference is owed to the state 
court findings under S 2254(d), but rejected those findings 
and refused to apply the presumption of correctness 
because "the state judge made those findings without ever 
taking into account the totality of the circumstances on the 
record." Id. at 920. It noted that Batson requires "that, one 
way or another, a trial court . . . consider all relevant 
circumstances before it issues a final ruling on a 
defendant's motion." Id. at 921. In a compelling statement 
of the court's role under step three of the Batson inquiry, 
the court wrote: 
 
       In light of the deferential standard of the post-AEDPA 
       S 2254 and the perfunctory quality of the second step 
       of a Batson inquiry after Purkett v. Elem, it is more 
       important today than ever that the Batson inquiry not 
       omit consideration of the totality of the circumstances, 
       both for itself and as it relates to the evaluation of 
       similarly situated potential jurors. . . . Under the pre- 
       AEDPA standards that apply here, we agree with the 
       district court that [defendant's] rights under Batson 
       were denied. 
 
Id. at 921-22. 
 
The state courts in this case rejected Riley's Batson claim 
without discussing any of the ample evidence that throws 
into question the explanations offered by the prosecutor for 
striking two of the black jurors and there is nothing 
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relevant in the record that might otherwise support the 
state courts' decisions. Thus, we do not know why the state 
courts found the State's explanation was plausible and 
credible in light of the other evidence. It is because of the 
state courts' omission of a requirement under the third step 
of the Batson inquiry -- of an ultimate determination on the 
issue of discriminatory intent based on all the facts and 
circumstances -- that the State's argument founders. 
 
We cannot avoid noting that Batson was not a death 
penalty case. This is. If the State failed to accord Riley his 
constitutional right to a jury selected on a race-neutral 
basis, we must not shirk to so hold. As Riley's lawyer asked 
at oral argument, "If not this case, what case? If the 
evidence in this case is insufficient to show that the 
prosecutors' race-neutral rationales were pretextual, what 
case, short of a prosecutorial mea culpa would do the job?" 
Tr. of Oral Argument at 3. 
 
After consideration of all the arguments and the record, 
we are compelled to conclude that the prosecution violated 
Riley's constitutional rights under Batson, and that Riley is 
entitled to relief. 
 
8. The Dissenting Opinion -- The Batson Issue 
 
It is fitting to discuss the Dissenting Opinion at this point 
because our difference with the Dissent is most acute in 
our respective views of the requirements of step three of the 
Batson inquiry. Although the Dissent takes issue with 
much of the majority opinion, its principal argument is that 
in a habeas case the federal court must defer to the state 
courts' findings, in this case the finding that the prosecutor 
did not use the State's peremptory challenges striking black 
jurors in a manner that violated the principles of Batson. 
We have already discussed in detail when a state court's 
findings are entitled to deference and when they are not, 
focusing on the exception in S 2254(d)(8) for the situation 
where the state court's findings are "not fairly supported by 
the record." See supra Part II.A.4 (Standard of Review). It is 
manifest that a finding that Batson has been satisfied must 
be made in accordance with the process enunciated in that 
case. 
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The Dissent agrees that under step three of the Batson 
inquiry a judge or court must consider "all of the relevant 
evidence that has been adduced." See Dis. Op. at 88. As we 
previously discussed, the courts after Batson  have 
described step three as requiring the judge or court to 
examine the prosecutor's proffered reasons for striking the 
minority jurors against the evidence presented by the 
defendant and/or the weaknesses in the prosecutor's 
reasons. See, e.g., McMillon, 14 F.3d at 953 n.4; Jordan, 
206 F.3d at 200. The Dissent sees no reason to believe that 
the Delaware courts did not do so in Riley's case, even 
though the opinions of the Delaware courts rejecting Riley's 
Batson challenges never commented on the weaknesses in 
the State's case or, even more important, never 
acknowledged that there was a step three to the Batson 
inquiry. We, therefore, proceed to try to ascertain whether 
the hearing judge and the Delaware Supreme Court made 
their findings that there was no purposeful discrimination 
in accordance with the process required by Batson. If not, 
then deference to those findings is not appropriate. 
 
The extent of the Delaware courts' recognition of the need 
to engage in the step three inquiry is open to question on 
this record. Nothing in the discussion of the hearing judge 
suggests that the court performed the necessary evaluation. 
See Riley IV, App. at 887-91. The hearing judge, using 
language taken from Riley I rather than Batson, understood 
that his obligation was to consider the prosecutor's 
proffered explanation for striking the jurors and"then . . . 
be satisfied by that neutral explanation and make a ruling 
to that effect." App. at 888. Accordingly, following what he 
understood to be the applicable law, the hearing judge 
discussed the prosecutor's proffered reasons for the two 
strikes at issue here, and found that the prosecutor was 
credible. See App. at 889 ("the State provided a credible, 
race-neutral reason for exercising its peremptory 
challenge") (emphasis added); id. ("The State articulated a 
specific race-neutral ground for challenging juror McGuire. 
. . .") (emphasis added). Throughout, the hearing judge 
made clear that he understood that "[t]he test applied is the 
credibility of the explanation given . . . ." App. at 890. 
Nothing in the hearing judge's discussion suggests that he 
undertook an evaluation of the proffered reasons in light of 
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the evidence submitted by Riley, which is the essence of 
step three. 
 
It is even more questionable whether on appeal from that 
decision the Delaware Supreme Court fully appreciated the 
requirement. Its entire discussion of this issue is fully set 
forth in the margin.9 In this one paragraph, the Court relied 
on its 1985 decision on Riley's direct appeal where it 
rejected Riley's challenge to the State's peremptory 
challenges. Riley I, 496 A.2d 997 (Del. 1985). The 1985 
decision is noteworthy because on that occasion (a year 
before Batson), the Delaware Supreme Court concluded, for 
the first time, that "use of peremptory challenges to exclude 
prospective jurors solely upon the basis of race violates a 
criminal defendant's right under Del. Const., Art. I, S 7 to a 
trial by an impartial jury." Riley I, 496 A.2d at 1012. 
 
In Riley I, the Court also set out the procedure to be 
followed10 but nothing in the Delaware Court's laudable 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The Court stated: 
 
       Riley's next contention, that the State exercised its peremptory 
       challenges for racial reasons, we find to be simply a renewed 
       attempt to reopen previously settled issues. In Riley I, [496 A.2d 
997 
       (Del. 1985)], we set forth a legal analysis functionally identical 
to the 
       Supreme Court's analysis later articulated in Batson, 476 U.S. at 
       79. In Riley I, we found that Riley's constitutional right to an 
       impartial jury had not been violated. 496 A.2d at 1009. The 
       Superior Court, after an evidentiary hearing on Riley's motion for 
       postconviction relief, held that Riley had not been denied equal 
       protection as a result of the State's use of peremptory challenges. 
       The court found that the State had provided race-neutral 
       explanations for its peremptory challenges. We find no error in 
       Superior Court's rejection of Riley's Batson claim. See Holland v. 
       Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990) (the Sixth Amendment fair cross-
section 
       requirement of an impartial jury does not deprive a party of the 
right 
       to exercise peremptory challenges on racial or any other grounds 
       from a venire that otherwise meets Sixth Amendment cross-sectional 
       standards of representativeness). Moreover, we reaffirm our earlier 
       decision sustaining the State's peremptory challenges on state 
       constitutional grounds. Riley I, 496 A.2d at 1010-1013. 
 
Riley V, 585 A.2d 719, 725 (Del. 1990). 
 
10. That procedure required that the defendant make a prima facie 
showing after which the trial judge 
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decision requires an inquiry comparable to the Batson step 
three. The Delaware cases at that time appear to have 
required that the prosecutor provide, or articulate, a race- 
neutral reason for the peremptory challenges, and that the 
court find the prosecutor to be credible. They do not require 
an evaluation comparable to step three. Therefore, if, as it 
appears, the Delaware Supreme Court in Riley IV  rejected 
Riley's Batson claim by relying on its earlier opinion in Riley 
I, and the Riley I opinion did not require a step three 
inquiry, any assumption that the Court engaged in such an 
inquiry would be unwarranted. Or, to phrase it somewhat 
differently, if the state courts' findings to which the Dissent 
would defer were not made in accordance with the process 
required by the United States Supreme Court, deference is 
not required. 
 
This digression into Delaware law was undertaken to 
provide the context in which to view the Dissent's 
subsidiary argument, which is that we should assume that 
the Delaware courts performed the step three analysis and 
that it was not necessary for the Delaware courts to 
comment on that analysis. We do not suggest that every 
state court decision that is the subject of a habeas review 
be as explicit as a Social Security Administrative Law 
Judge's decision. See Dis. Op. at 89. But Batson is not a 
disability case. Although a judge considering a Batson 
challenge is not required to comment explicitly on every 
piece of evidence in the record, some engagement with the 
evidence considered is necessary as part of step three of the 
Batson inquiry. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       determine[s] whether there is a substantial likelihood that the 
       prosecutor is exercising the State's peremptory challenges on the 
       basis of race. A ruling in favor of the State will end any further 
       inquiry. A ruling in favor of the defendant, however, will shift 
the 
       burden to the State to prove that the exercised challenges were not 
       racially motivated. To sustain this burden, the State . . . must 
       satisfy the court that its peremptory challenges were made on 
       grounds of specific, individual juror bias, or on grounds 
reasonably 
       related to the particular case or trial . . . and not solely on the 
       ground of the juror's race. 
 
Riley I, 496 A.2d at 1013 (quotation and citation omitted). 
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In United States v. Harris, 192 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 
1999), the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's 
rejection of a Batson challenge in a case where one African- 
American juror was seated but two were struck by the 
government's peremptory challenges. The Court of Appeals 
remanded because it found that the district court's"terse 
analysis" of step three of the Batson inquiry was 
insufficient as it appeared that the district court"made no 
effort to weigh the credibility of the prosecutor's asserted 
reasons for striking the panelists." Id. at 588. A year earlier, 
in United States v. Hill, 146 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 1998), the 
same court remanded another case to the district court 
because its analysis of step three of the Batson  inquiry was 
insufficient. The court stated, in language that could be 
equally applicable here, that "[t]he record before us 
indicates nothing about the district court's thought 
processes in its step three analysis apart from its abrupt 
conclusion indicating the apparent view that the 
prosecutor's asserted justification outweighed [the 
defendant's] showing under the totality of circumstances." 
Id. at 342. And in Hill, unlike here, the trial court ruling on 
the Batson claim at least stated that it performed some sort 
of weighing analysis. 
 
Although both of these cases came to the Court of 
Appeals on direct appeal of a district court decision rather 
than on habeas review of a state decision, that does not 
detract from the force of the court's understanding of what 
is required in a Batson inquiry. The process required by 
Batson, including step three, does not differ if the 
prosecutor used the peremptories to strike jurors in a state 
trial or in a federal trial. After all, the same Constitution 
applies to both fora. 
 
The Dissent relies almost exclusively on the statutory 
presumption of correctness owed to a state court's factual 
determination made after a hearing on the merits. This 
deference is indeed the fulcrum on which our federalism 
turns. Yet in case after case -- and most particularly in 
capital cases -- we have found that even applying the more 
stringent post-AEDPA standard of review (not applicable 
here), there are reasons not to accord the usual deference 
to the state courts' findings. See, e.g., Jermyn v. Horn, 266 
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F.3d 257, 305 (3d Cir. 2001) (post-AEDPA denial of 
deference to state court because it unreasonably applied 
the principles of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984)); Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 120 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(post-AEDPA denial of deference to state court because "[a] 
reasonable application of Supreme Court precedent . . . 
requires finding [defendant's] trial was so infected with 
unfairness that he was denied due process"); Appel v. Horn, 
250 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2001) (post-AEDPA denial of 
deference to state court because, among other things, the 
state court failed to apply the relevant Supreme Court 
precedent of United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)). 
 
As we discuss in detail in the immediately preceding 
section of this opinion, see supra Part II.A.7 (Analysis), the 
requirement that the state courts faced with a Batson 
challenge engage in the critical step three analysis is not a 
product of our own creativity but an accepted element of a 
habeas court's obligation to examine whether a defendant's 
constitutional right to a race-neutral jury has been 
infringed. See, e.g., Jordan, 206 F.3d at 200; Coulter, 155 
F.3d at 921; McMillon, 14 F.3d at 953 n.4; Jones, 987 F.2d 
at 967. 
 
The Dissent accords little weight to these authorities. But 
our disinclination to include long string cites does not 
mean that there are not numerous cases in which the 
courts, both state11 and federal, have made clear that the 
Batson step three inquiry is not merely a formalistic one, 
but an integral element of the required analysis. In addition 
to Harris and Hill, the Sixth Circuit cases cited above, the 
Second Circuit has also made this point. In Barnes v. 
Anderson, 202 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 1999), the court ordered a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. See, e.g., MacKintrush v. State , 978 S.W.2.d 293, 297 (Ark. 1998) 
(describing step three of Batson as requiring "that the trial court weigh 
and assess what has been presented to it to decide whether in light of 
all the circumstances, the proponent's explanation is or is not 
pretextual"); State v. Collier, 553 So.2d 815, 821 (La. 1989) (holding 
that 
the trial judge cannot simply "[r]ubber stamp. . . [a prosecutor's] non- 
racial explanation, no matter how whimsical or fanciful, . . . [but] in 
order to permit a questioned [peremptory] challenge, . . . must conclude 
that the proffered reasons are, first, neutral and reasonable, and, 
second, not a pretext") (quotation omitted). 
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new trial because the trial court had denied a Batson 
motion "without explicit adjudication of the credibility of the 
non-movant's race-neutral explanations for the challenged 
strikes." Id. at 156 (emphasis added). 
 
The Dissent suggests that we exceed our authority as a 
habeas court when we comment on the failure of the state 
courts reviewing Riley's Batson challenge to provide a 
reasoned statement for their rejection of Riley's challenge. 
Although the state court is not required to "comment on all 
of the evidence" before it, Dis. Op. at 89 (emphasis added), 
an adequate step three Batson analysis requires something 
more than a "terse," Harris, 192 F.3d at 588, "abrupt," Hill, 
146 F.3d at 342, comment that the prosecutor has satisfied 
Batson. 
 
Similarly, we do not think that a habeas court may reject 
a state court's ruling on a Batson claim simply because "it 
was not persuaded by a particular piece of proof," as the 
Dissent states. Dis. Op. at 87. However, as we have 
explained, without any such statement there is no basis on 
this record to determine if the state courts undertook, or 
even were aware of, the required Batson step three inquiry. 
The Fourth Circuit expressed the same thought in United 
States v. Joe, 928 F.2d 99, 103 (4th Cir. 1991), where it 
stated: "[T]he failure of the district court to rule at each 
step of the Batson analysis deprives . . .[a reviewing] court 
of the benefit of its factual determination and the reasons 
supporting its ultimate holding." And its cases make clear 
that such review requires that the trial court's rulings must 
be clearly articulated. See, e.g., Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 
417, 421 (4th Cir. 1995) ("The ruling of the district court is 
so unclear that we cannot determine on the present record 
whether the ultimate conclusion of the district court to 
overrule [the Batson] objection may be sustained."); United 
States v. Blotcher, No. 95-5590, 1996 U.S. App. Lexis 
19835, *11-*12 (4th Cir. August 7, 1996) (unpublished) 
("We find the record so unclear that we cannot determine 
whether the district court applied the proper legal analysis 
in sustaining the prosecution's Batson objection to 
[defendent's] peremptory strike against [a] juror."). 
 
Most of the Dissent's other comments on the Batson 
issue in this case have been previously anticipated and 
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discussed. We take this opportunity, however, to remark 
upon the manner in which the Dissent comments upon the 
reference to the pattern of the State's use of its 
peremptories to exclude black jurors in all four first degree 
murder cases, including Riley's, tried in the county the 
same year. Because of the lack of information about some 
of those cases, we refrained from suggesting that such 
evidence, standing alone, would show intentional 
discrimination but pointed out that it was the State that 
sought an opportunity to produce supplementary evidence. 
The following correspondence, which was preceded by the 
oral dialogue quoted previously in its opinion, supra at 
typescript page 18, clarifies the situation. 
 
On January 9, 1989, the hearing judge wrote to counsel: 
 
        This will confirm the conclusion of the postconviction 
       relief hearing in the above-captioned matter. It is the 
       Court's understanding that the defendant's 
       presentation and all rebuttal by the State available on 
       the date of the hearing has been completed. However, 
       at the State's request, the Court did hold the record 
       open on the hearing to be supplemented by a rebuttal 
       summary of jury composition in State peremptory 
       challenges in first degree murder trials in Kent County 
       over a determined period of time if the State wished to 
       supplement the record. 
 
        Further, the hearing record will close on January 30, 
       1989; the Court expects proposed findings of fact and 
       conclusions of law from both parties no later than 
       February 6, 1989. 
 
See Letter to this Court from Thomas J. Allingham II (Dec. 
16, 1999), Ex. B (on file in the Clerk's office) (emphasis 
added). 
 
Some three weeks later, on January 27, 1989, and just 
before the hearing record was to close, the State advised 
the court as follows: 
 
        Please be advised that the State will not supplement 
       the record of the post conviction relief hearing held in 
       the above-captioned matter on December 30, 1988. 
 
Id. 
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Thus the State, which had assured the court that 
materials from other cases "do exist" that would be contrary 
to Riley's representation, App. at 874, and having been 
given the opportunity that it requested to supplement the 
record with evidence as to jury composition, surprisingly 
and without explanation, declined to produce evidence that 
blacks served on juries in first degree murder cases in the 
county in the same period that Riley was tried before an all- 
white jury. The presumption that could be drawn from 
these facts is one of the circumstances that should have 
been evaluated by the Delaware courts in the required step 
three inquiry. 
 
The Dissent comments that Riley offered no expert 
analysis of the statistics. The procedural posture of the 
case at that time provided no such opportunity. Riley 
produced evidence of the statistics of the racial composition 
of the jurors in the four cases, the State requested the 
additional time to provide counter-evidence, and the 
hearing judge left the record open for that purpose. There 
would have been no basis for expert analysis until all the 
evidence as to jury composition was produced. The State's 
letter that it would produce no evidence was dated three 
days before the record closed. 
 
Further, the Dissent's attempt to analogize the statistical 
evidence of the use of peremptory challenges to strike black 
jurors to the percent of left-handed presidents requires 
some comment. The dissent has overlooked the obvious fact 
that there is no provision in the Constitution that protects 
persons from discrimination based on whether they are 
right-handed or left handed. To suggest any comparability 
to the striking of jurors based on their race is to minimize 
the history of discrimination against prospective black 
jurors and black defendants, which was the raison d'etre of 
the Batson decision. 
 
To reiterate, the factual findings of a state court are 
entitled to deference only when there is "probative evidence 
underlying [its] conclusion." See Rushen, 464 U.S. at 122 
n.6. The Dissent points to no such probative evidence. It 
relies merely on the credibility finding of the hearing judge, 
a finding that we cannot be sure was made following 
consideration of all the evidence presented by Riley and the 
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weaknesses he pointed to in the prosecutor's proffered 
reasons. 
 
9. Appropriate Remedy 
 
When counsel for the State was asked at the en banc 
argument whether, if this court were to find a Batson 
violation, the State would rather the relief be the grant of a 
new trial or the remand for a federal evidentiary hearing, 
counsel candidly responded: 
 
        MR. MEYERS: If we -- the answer is yes. If, and if we 
       -- I mean, if the court imagines, has all these problems 
       with the hearing that was done six years after the trial, 
       those problems are simply going to be magnified, 
       amplified by exponential order of magnitude 20 years 
       after the trial. I mean if you think that people have 
       memory problems six years, how much worse are you 
       going to be 20 years later? 
 
Tr. of Oral Argument at 46. Riley's counsel concurred, 
stating that a federal habeas judge would be no better off 
than the hearing judge was in 1988. 
 
We agree. Much of the Dissent's opposition is directed to 
the majority's failure to remand to the District Court for a 
hearing but the Dissent may have overlooked that both 
parties preferred a new trial to a remand should this court 
find that the state proceedings were not shown to be 
consistent with the requirement of Batson. It is highly 
unlikely that the witnesses can provide more illuminating 
testimony thirteen years later. Moreover, there are no 
factual issues that can be solved by a federal evidentiary 
hearing.12 Although the Dissent chooses to characterize the 
result in this case as a federal court's substitution of its 
own findings for those of the state court, in fact we are 
merely fulfilling the traditional role of a federal habeas 
court, which is, in part, to determine whether the state 
court's decision is "fairly supported by the record." The one 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. This is unlike the situation in Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750 (3d 
Cir. 1993), where we held that the state court's finding regarding the 
delay in the proceedings was not entitled to the presumption of 
correctness but directed the district court to determine in a federal 
habeas evidentiary hearing the reason for the delay. 
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possible factual issue cannot be resolved by a hearing,13 
and the statistical evidence, which might be the subject of 
some analysis at such a hearing, is relevant but not 
dispositive to our decision. 
 
The question of the remedy a habeas court should order 
following a finding that the state process did not comply 
with constitutional requirements is not a new one. In 
Brown v. Kelly, 973 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1992), the federal 
court of appeals was faced with a comparable situation as 
that before us. Defendant was convicted in state court of 
murder and first degree robbery. He eventually came to the 
federal court with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 
claiming, inter alia, a violation of Batson. The federal courts 
did not find that Batson had been violated but the Second 
Circuit took the opportunity to consider the appropriate 
remedy when a constitutional violation is found by the 
federal courts sitting in habeas. The court stated,"[T]here 
are cases where the passage of time may impair a trial 
court's ability to make a reasoned determination of the 
prosecutor's state of mind when the jury was selected. 
Where such demonstrably exists, there must be a new 
trial." Id. at 121. 
 
The Brown court cited United States v. Alcantar, 897 F.2d 
436, 438-39 (9th Cir. 1990) (ordering a new trial because 
there was inadequate evidence to determine, as part of 
Batson analysis, why the jurors were struck). And in 
Barnes, 202 F.3d at 157, the Court of Appeals ordered a 
new trial rather than a remand for a hearing on the Batson 
issues because the trial judge had died and the court was 
"not confident . . . that further proceedings would . . . shed 
reliable light upon the voir dire.") (quotation omitted). 
 
The circumstances of this case are closely analogous to 
those in Hardcastle v. Horn, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2001 WL 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Although neither party has focused on it, there is an apparent 
factual discrepancy between McGuire's testimony that he did not request 
to be excused, App. at 850, and the trial judge's statement that McGuire 
came to see him and requested to be excused, App. at 250. It is agreed 
that McGuire saw the trial judge, but McGuire testified it was at the 
judge's direction. As the trial judge is deceased, a federal evidentiary 
hearing would not resolve this issue, even if it were important to do so. 
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722781 (E.D. Pa., June 27, 2001), where the district court 
found a Batson violation but dismissed the notion of 
ordering a federal evidentiary hearing instead of a new trial 
in state court, commenting that "[n]early twenty years have 
passed since Petitioner's trial, such a length of time that 
even Respondents admit that an evidentiary hearing on 
Petitioner's Batson claim is unlikely to be helpful." Id. at 
*19. The Hardcastle court stated that "[a] new trial is 
especially appropriate where as here, the passage of time 
makes a new evidentiary hearing on the petition 
impossible." Id.14 Likewise, we see no reason to order the 
District Court to provide Riley with an evidentiary hearing 
that it declined to provide on two prior occasions. Instead, 
we will reverse the District Court's order denying Riley's 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and remand for the 
District Court to grant the writ without prejudice to the 
State retrying the case pursuant to the guidelines to be set 
by the District Court. 
 
B. 
 
THE CALDWELL CLAIM 
 
In addition to Riley's Batson claim presented to the en 
banc court, Riley argues that the prosecutor and the trial 
judge made remarks to the jury during the penalty hearing 
that misled the jury as to its sense of responsibility in the 
sentencing process, in violation of the principles set forth in 
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985). In Caldwell, 
the Supreme Court held that prosecutorial comments at 
sentencing violated the Eighth Amendment by leading the 
jury to believe that ultimate responsibility for determining 
the appropriateness of the death sentence rested with the 
state supreme court. See 472 U.S. at 333. 
 
The Delaware Supreme Court, on direct appeal, rejected 
Riley's Caldwell claim, commenting that"[i]n no sense may 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. The Hardcastle case is on appeal to this court, and our reference to 
this limited aspect of the decision, which is applicable here, is not 
intended to reflect an opinion as to the merits of the District Court's 
decision on the Batson issue. 
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it reasonably be said that the prosecutor was either 
misstating the law, misleading the jury as to its role, or 
minimizing its sentencing responsibility." Riley I, 496 A.2d 
at 1025. The District Court agreed, thus denying Riley 
habeas relief. See Riley VIII, 1998 WL 172856, at *31. A 
Caldwell claim presents mixed questions of law and fact 
subject to plenary review in the habeas context. See Miller 
v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112-14 (1985); see also Moore v. 
Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1171 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 
In Caldwell, the defense attorney in a capital murder 
case pleaded with the jury in closing arguments at the 
sentencing phase to spare the defendant's life. In reply, the 
prosecutor stated: 
 
       Ladies and gentlemen, I intend to be brief. I'm in 
       complete disagreement with the approach the defense 
       has taken. I don't think it's fair. I think it's unfair. I 
       think the lawyers know better. Now, they would have 
       you believe that you're going to kill this man and they 
       know--they know that your decision is not the final 
       decision. My God, how unfair can you be? Your job is 
       reviewable. They know it. 
 
472 U.S. at 325 (emphases added). 
 
Caldwell's defense counsel objected to this statement but 
the trial court overruled the objection, stating that it was 
"proper that the jury realizes it is reviewable automatically 
as the death penalty commands." Id. The prosecutor 
continued: 
 
       Throughout their remarks, they attempted to give you 
       the opposite, sparing the truth. They said `Thou shall 
       not kill.' If that applies to him, it applies to you, 
       insinuating that your decision is the final decision and 
       that they're gonna take Bobby Caldwell out in the front 
       of this Courthouse in moments and string him up and 
       that is terribly, terribly unfair. For they know, as I 
       know, and as Judge Baker has told you, that the 
       decision you render is automatically reviewable by the 
       Supreme Court. Automatically, and I think it's unfair 
       and I don't mind telling them so. 
 
Id. at 325-26 (emphasis added). 
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Although the jury's sentence in Caldwell was indeed 
subject to automatic review by the state supreme court, the 
United States Supreme Court's plurality opinion stated that 
the prosecutor's statement was "inaccurate, both because it 
was misleading as to the nature of the appellate court's 
review and because it depicted the jury's role in a way 
fundamentally at odds with the role that a capital sentencer 
must perform." Id. at 336. Justice O'Connor, who cast the 
fifth and deciding vote, emphasized that "[j]urors may 
harbor misconceptions about the power of state appellate 
courts or, for that matter, [the United States Supreme 
Court] to override a jury's sentence of death." Id. at 342 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). According to Justice O'Connor, 
the prosecutor's statements were impermissible because 
they "creat[ed] the mistaken impression that automatic 
appellate review of the jury's sentence would provide the 
authoritative determination of whether death was 
appropriate" whereas under state law the relevant scope of 
review was limited to whether the verdict was "so arbitrary 
that it was against the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence." Id. at 343 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quotation 
omitted). 
 
In Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994), the Supreme 
Court clarified the Caldwell holding. Accepting Justice 
O'Connor's concurrence as controlling, the Romano Court 
explained that Caldwell prohibits prosecutorial comments 
that "mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing 
process in a way that allows the jury to feel less responsible 
than it should for the sentencing decision." Id. at 9 
(quotation omitted). Accordingly, "[t]o establish a Caldwell 
violation, a defendant necessarily must show that the 
remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned 
to the jury by local law." Id. (quotation omitted). The Court 
subsequently rejected Romano's Caldwell claim because 
"the jury was not affirmatively misled regarding its role in 
the sentencing process." Id. 
 
In Riley's case, Liguori began his opening comments in 
the penalty phase by stating: 
 
       As the Judge has explained to you we have a specific 
       statute with regard to what occurred in a penalty 
       hearing in a capital case. 
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       Let me say at the outset that what you do today is 
       automatically reviewed by our Supreme Court and that 
       is why there is an automatic review on the death 
       penalty. That is why, if you return a decision of death, 
       that is why you will receive and have to fill out a two- 
       page interrogatory that the Court will give you. This is 
       an interrogatory that specifically sets out the questions 
       that the State request and whether or not you believe 
       it beyond a reasonable doubt and if you want in your 
       determination, if you believe the sentence should be 
       death than each and every one of you has to sign this. 
       This goes to the Supreme Court. That is why it is 
       concise and we believe clear and it should be looked 
       carefully on and answered appropriately. 
 
App. at 393 (emphases added). 
 
At oral argument before the en banc court, the State 
conceded that Liguori's statement, at least "on its face," is 
no different from that of the prosecutor in Caldwell. Tr. of 
Oral Argument at 49. Counsel for the State told us that 
when "[y]ou compare the two, they are pretty much alike." 
Tr. of Oral Argument at 49. Like the statement in Caldwell, 
Liguori's statement regarding automatic appellate review 
was technically accurate since Delaware law provided for 
automatic review by the Delaware Supreme Court of a 
jury's sentence of death. However, that automatic review 
was extremely limited, as was that of the Mississippi 
Supreme Court in Caldwell. 
 
At the time of Riley's sentencing hearing, the relevant 
portion of the capital sentencing statute provided: 
 
       The Supreme Court shall limit its review under this 
       section to the recommendation on and imposition of 
       the penalty of death and shall determine: 
 
       a. Whether, considering the totality of evidence in 
       aggravation and mitigation which bears upon the 
       particular circumstances or details of the offense and 
       the character and propensities of the offender, the 
       death penalty was either arbitrarily or capriciously 
       imposed or recommended . . . . 
 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, S 4209(g)(2) (1982) (emphasis 
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added). Indeed, in Delaware the jury's weighing of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances was, for all 
practical purposes, final. We have found no published 
opinion during the relevant time period in which the 
Delaware Supreme Court reversed a jury's sentence of 
death as arbitrarily or capriciously imposed.15 
 
It is apparent, then, that, like the prosecutor's statement 
in Caldwell, Liguori's reference to automatic appellate 
review was misleading as to the scope of appellate review. 
As was explained in Caldwell, jurors may not understand 
the limited nature of appellate review, which affords 
substantial deference to a jury's determination that death is 
the appropriate sentence. See 472 U.S. at 332-33. 
Furthermore, jurors who are unconvinced that death is the 
appropriate punishment but who are eager to send a 
message of disapproval for the defendant's acts might be 
"very receptive to the prosecutor's assurance that [they] can 
more freely err because the error may be corrected on 
appeal." Id. at 331 (quotation omitted). As one of our sister 
circuits has explained, "[f]or the jury to see itself as 
advisory when it is not, or to be comforted by a belief that 
its decision will not have effect unless others make the 
same decision, is a frustration of the essence of the jury 
function." Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1282 (5th Cir. 
1989). 
 
It is therefore not enough to argue, as the State does, 
that Liguori's comments at sentencing were a correct and 
accurate statement of Delaware law. The statute at the time 
contained more than 40 different provisions detailing 
procedures and requirements applicable to a death 
sentence, but the only one the prosecutor chose to 
emphasize was that providing for automatic review of the 
jury's sentence. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The Delaware capital sentencing scheme was substantially amended 
in 1991. Under the amended statute, "the jury now functions only in an 
advisory capacity. The judge, after taking the jury's recommendation into 
consideration, has the ultimate responsibility for determining whether 
the defendant will be sentenced to life imprisonment or death." State v. 
Cohen, 604 A.2d 846, 849 (Del. 1992). In contrast, when Riley was 
sentenced, the jury's death sentence was binding on the judge. 
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Nor does the State satisfactorily explain why Liguori 
referred to "automatic review on the death penalty" in 
connection with his explanation of the interrogatory form. 
App. at 393. The interrogatory form contained only two 
questions: whether the jury unanimously found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance existed16 
and, if the jury answered "yes," whether it unanimously 
recommended a sentence of death. Such a simple and 
straightforward form hardly needed an explanation. 
Instead, that "explanation" appears to have been used as a 
segue to alert the jury to the fact that the Delaware 
Supreme Court would automatically review its decision to 
impose a death sentence. 
 
"The sentencing decision in capital cases is born out of 
an inherent and unique mixture of anger, judgment and 
retribution, and requires a determination whether certain 
acts are so beyond the pale of community standards as to 
warrant the execution of their author." Sawyer, 881 F.2d at 
1278. Perhaps more than any other decision rendered by a 
jury, a sentence of death is "irreducibl[y] discretionary." Id. 
Yet in Caldwell, the Supreme Court noted that "[b]elief in 
the truth of the assumption that sentencers treat their 
power to determine the appropriateness of death as an 
awesome responsibility has allowed this Court to view 
sentencer discretion as consistent with--and indeed as 
indispensable to--the Eighth Amendment's need for 
reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate 
punishment in a specific case." 472 U.S. at 330 (quotations 
omitted). It follows that there is particular concern "when 
there are state-induced suggestions that the sentencing 
jury may shift its sense of responsibility to an appellate 
court." Id. Unlike our decision in Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 
923 F.2d 284, 306 (3d Cir. 1991), where we rejected a 
Caldwell claim, in part because "[t]here was no suggestion 
to the jury that the [state] Supreme Court . .. or anyone 
else would have the last word in the case," here the 
prosecutor expressly stated both "there is an automatic 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. The jury had previously been instructed that, by convicting Riley of 
felony murder, it already had found that an aggravating circumstance 
existed. 
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review" and "[t]his goes to the [state] Supreme Court." App. 
at 393. 
 
The Dissent suggests that there was no Caldwell  violation 
here because the prosecutor's statement was made"near 
the very beginning of his summation," and consisted of 
"accurate, unemotional, passing remarks." The Dissent also 
characterizes the prosecutor's remarks as "the mere 
mention of the fact that there would be an automatic 
appeal to the state supreme court." 
 
It is true that the prosecutor's statement was made near 
the beginning of his summation, but his summation was 
not a lengthy speech, occupying a mere four pages of the 
transcript, App. at 393-97, of which the remarks in 
question take almost a full page. We cannot tell whether 
they were "emotional" or not, but they can hardly be 
characterized as "passing," as the prosecutor began by 
saying, "Let me say at the outset that what you do today is 
automatically reviewed by our Supreme Court." And, as we 
noted above, in that one paragraph, the prosecutor referred 
not once but twice to the Supreme Court -- both 
mentioning "automatic review" and that the interrogatory to 
be completed by the jurors also "goes to the Supreme 
Court." 
 
We are unwilling to treat lightly the prosecutor's pointed 
references to appellate review of this crucial decision. 
Statements, like those made by the prosecutor here,"can 
be literally true but quite misleading by failing, for example, 
to disclose information essential to make what was said not 
misleading." Sawyer, 881 F.2d at 1285. As a result, a 
Caldwell violation may be established where a technically 
accurate statement describing the state appellate review 
process nonetheless "misled the jury to minimize its role in 
the sentencing process." Driscoll v. Delo, 71 F.3d 701, 713 
(8th Cir. 1995) (holding that prosecutor had violated 
Caldwell by emphasizing that the trial judge could 
disregard the jury's recommendation of death even though 
no state judge had in fact ever done so). 
 
Given the limited nature of the Delaware Supreme 
Court's review of a jury's sentence of death at the time of 
Riley's sentencing, a fact Liguori did not explain to the jury, 
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we conclude that there was a Caldwell violation in this case.17 
As suggested in Caldwell, jurors are unlikely to understand 
the exceptionally narrow scope of appellate review given to 
jury determinations on death. See 472 U.S. at 330-31; see 
also id. at 342 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Although 
Liguori's remarks were brief, they were the first comments 
that the jury heard at sentencing, making them more likely 
to have made an impression. A statement does not have to 
be lengthy to be effective in suggesting to the jury that 
ultimate responsibility for sentencing lies elsewhere. 
 
Moreover, nothing the trial court said corrected any 
misimpression left by the prosecution's statements, as the 
judge made no comment whatsoever pertaining to appellate 
review. Unlike Jones v. Butler, 864 F.2d 348, 360 (5th Cir. 
1988), where the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held 
that the prosecutor's statement that "[I]f, in fact, you do 
return the death penalty . . . yours will not be the last 
word. Every sentence is reviewed by the Supreme Court," 
was improper but cured by a prompt curative instruction 
by the trial judge, here there was no curative instruction.18 
 
Caldwell and its progeny make clear that"the sentencing 
jury must continue to feel the weight of responsibility so 
long as it has responsibility." Sawyer, 881 F.2d at 1282. 
Because the prosecutor's remarks may have misled the jury 
into thinking the Delaware Supreme Court was the final 
arbiter of Riley's fate, we conclude that Riley's 
constitutional rights were violated under Caldwell. Thus, 
even were we to find that Riley has not shown a Batson 
violation entitling him to a new trial, we still would direct 
the District Court to grant the writ of habeas corpus 
entitling Riley to a new sentencing hearing. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. At oral argument counsel for the State acknowledged that "[p]erhaps 
better practice would have been for Liguori to insert the word `limited' " 
into his reference to automatic appellate review. Tr. of Oral Argument at 
50. This could be construed as a concession by the State that Liguori's 
comments were misleading because of what they did not tell the jury. 
 
18. We are not persuaded by Riley's contention that the trial judge's 
repeated references to the jury's determination on death as a 
"recommendation" misled the jury as to its actual responsibility in the 
sentencing process. See generally Flamer v. Delaware, 68 F.3d 710 (3d 
Cir. 1995). 
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III. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This is an appropriate case for the issuance of a writ of 
habeas corpus. One of the principal objections to the 
operation of the death penalty in this country is that it is 
applied unevenly, particularly against poor black 
defendants. Another concern is that because of the complex 
review process, the jury may not comprehend the 
significance of its life-or-death decision. Both of these 
issues are implicated in this case. An appropriate order 
follows. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Excerpts from Panel Opinion in Riley v. Taylor, 
No. 98-9009 
Filed January 17, 2001 
 
Panel: SLOVITER, ALITO, and STAPLETON, Circuit  Judges 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
. . . 
 
III. 
 
Riley next argues that adverse publicity prevented him 
from obtaining a trial by an impartial jury. He contends, 
first, that it should be presumed that he was prejudiced by 
pretrial publicity because the record establishes the 
existence of a "hostile trial atmosphere" and, second, that 
the record shows that several jurors were unable to be 
impartial due to exposure to unfavorable pretrial publicity. 
 
A. 
 
"Where media or other community reaction to a crime or 
a defendant engenders an atmosphere so hostile and 
pervasive as to preclude a rational trial process, a court 
reviewing for constitutional error will presume prejudice to 
the defendant without reference to an examination of the 
attitudes of those who served as the defendant's jurors." 
Rock v. Zimmerman, 959 F.2d 1237, 1252 (3d Cir. 1992). 
See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes 
v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 
U.S. 723 (1963); Flamer v. Delaware, 68 F.3d 736, 755 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (en banc). "The community and media reaction, 
however, must have been so hostile and so pervasive as to 
make it apparent that even the most careful voir dire 
process would be unable to assure an impartial jury.. . . 
Such cases are exceedingly rare." Rock, 959 F.2d at 1252- 
53. 
 
In this case, the state courts made a finding of 
impartiality. Such a finding is entitled to deference, see 
Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 & n. 7 (1984), and we 
find no basis for overturning that finding. 
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Riley relies on a relatively small number of newspaper 
articles, almost half of which appeared six months or more 
before the trial. Although two of the articles named Riley as 
a suspect in Feeley's murder, and although a few of the 
articles discussed the plight of the Feeley children, who 
were orphaned by the murder, the articles were not 
inflammatory. In short, the media coverage was not"so 
hostile and pervasive as to preclude a rational trial 
process." Rock, 959 F.2d at 1252. 
 
B. 
 
Because Riley has not shown the presence of 
circumstances justifying a presumption of prejudice, he 
"must establish that those who actually served on his jury 
lacked a capacity to reach a fair and impartial verdict based 
solely on the evidence they heard in the courtroom." Rock, 
959 F.2d at 1253. See also Patton, 467 U.S. at 1035; Irvin 
v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961). "The fact that jury 
members may have been exposed to press reports or other 
community reaction concerning the case and even the fact 
that they may have formed a tentative opinion based on 
that exposure will not establish a constitutional violation if 
the trial court has found, with record support, that each of 
the jurors was able to put aside extrinsic influences." Rock, 
959 F.2d at 1253. 
 
Riley contends that two jurors, Leon Morris and Carl 
Patterson, were unable to be impartial due to exposure to 
pretrial publicity. We do not agree. 
 
Morris testified during voir dire that he "had read 
something about" the case in the newspaper at the time of 
the murder and that he had heard on the radio that the 
case was "coming to trial." App. 277. The following 
exchange then occurred: 
 
        Q. . . . Because of what you read in the newspaper, 
       do you feel that you could sit here as an impartial 
       jury? 
 
        A. Yes, because I know nothing of the evidence or 
       anything else. 
 
App. 278. 
 
                                53 
  
Carl Patterson during voir dire was asked whether 
anything he had read in the newspaper had created bias or 
prejudice against the defendant. See App. 294. He 
responded that he could not remember a lot of what he 
read in the newspaper. See id. The following colloquy then 
occurred: 
 
        Q. Then do you know of any reason why you can't 
       render an impartial verdict based solely upon the law 
       and the evidence? 
 
        A. No, Your Honor. 
 
Id. 
 
The trial judge implicitly found that these jurors were 
impartial, and the Delaware Supreme Court agreed on 
direct appeal. Such implicit findings are entitled to a 
presumption of correctness. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35 
(1992); Weeks v. Snyder, 2000 WL 975043 (3d Cir. July 17, 
2000); Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 290 (3d Cir. 
2000), and we see no ground for holding that that 
presumption has been overcome. 
 
IV. 
 
Riley argues that the prosecution violated his right to due 
process by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence in its 
possession as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963). In Brady, the Supreme Court held that "the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution." Id. at 87. To state a valid Brady claim, a 
plaintiff must show that the evidence was (1) suppressed, 
(2) favorable, and (3) material to the defense. See United 
States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 970 (3d Cir. 1991). 
Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that 
the outcome would have been different had the evidence 
been disclosed to the defense. See United States v. Bagley, 
473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985). Evidence that may be used to 
impeach may qualify as Brady material. See Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 445 (1995); Bagley , 473 U.S. at 676. 
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Riley's Brady argument concerns a wiretap on the 
telephone of the mother of Tyrone Baxter. Before trial, 
Riley's lawyer asked the state to produce recordings or 
transcripts of the intercepted calls, but the state refused, 
arguing that the tapes contained no exculpatory material. 
Without listening to the tape himself, the trial judge 
accepted the prosecutor's representation and denied Riley's 
motion for production. Throughout the subsequent 
proceedings in state and federal court, no judge listened to 
the tapes. 
 
In his briefs in this appeal, Riley made a strong Brady 
argument. He asserted that between the time of the Feeley 
murder and Baxter's arrest, "Baxter spoke to his mother on 
the telephone on several occasions"; that "Baxter's 
testimony was the State's strongest evidence against" him; 
and that statements made by Baxter to his mother might 
have provided valuable impeachment evidence. Appellant's 
Br. at 5. At a minimum, he contended, the state courts or 
the District Court should have listened to the tapes in 
camera to determine whether they contained Brady  
material. 
 
At oral argument, however, counsel for the appellees 
represented that an examination of the logs of the wiretap 
on Mrs. Baxter's telephone did not reveal any intercepted 
conversations in which Baxter participated. Copies of the 
logs were provided to Riley's attorneys and to the court, and 
Riley's attorneys submitted a letter-brief commenting on the 
contents of the logs. We have examined the logs, and it 
appears that the state's representation is correct: we see no 
record of any conversations in which Baxter participated. 
The revelation that the logs do not mention any such 
conversations fatally undermines the Brady argument made 
in Riley's briefs. 
 
In their post-argument letter-brief commenting on the 
logs, Riley's attorneys advance different arguments to show 
that an in camera inspection of the wiretap recordings is 
required. A defendant seeking an in camera inspection to 
determine whether files contain Brady material must at 
least make a "plausible showing" that the inspection will 
reveal material evidence. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 
39, 58 n.15 (1987) (quoting United States v. Valenzuela- 
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Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)). Mere speculation is not 
enough. United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625, 631 (7th 
Cir. 1984). The arguments made by Riley's attorneys in 
their post-argument submission do not satisfy this 
standard. 
 
Riley's attorneys first note that several log entries 
"expressly refer to conversations about Tyrone Baxter." 
12/16/99 Letter-brief at 3 (emphasis added). But it is 
unlikely that statements "about" Baxter by third persons -- 
unlike statements made by Baxter himself -- could have 
been used to impeach Baxter's testimony or could have 
been admitted at trial on some other ground. For that 
reason alone, it is unlikely that these statements are 
material. See Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1995). 
Moreover, even if the problem of admissibility is put aside, 
it is pure speculation to suppose that the contents of the 
statements are in any way exculpatory. 
 
Riley's attorneys also suggest that conversations between 
Baxter and his mother may have been intercepted and 
recorded but that the person or persons who compiled the 
logs may not have recognized Baxter's voice. This, however, 
is nothing but the purest speculation. We note that the 
wiretap occurred while the police were seeking to arrest 
Baxter; they therefore had a strong incentive to identify him 
if he participated in any of the intercepted conversations. 
We have considered all of Riley's Brady arguments and find 
them to be without merit. 
 
V. 
 
Riley argues that he was denied the effective assistance 
of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial.1 The District 
Court held that many of Riley's arguments concerning the 
alleged deficiencies of his attorney's performance were never 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Riley's amended federal habeas petition raised claims regarding the 
alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel at the guilty phase, but the 
District Court held that these claims were procedurally barred. See Riley 
VI, 1998 WL 172856, at **18-20. On appeal, Riley refers to these claims 
in a footnote. See Appellant's Br. at 38 n.16. This footnote is inadequate 
to raise the issue on appeal. 
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presented to the Delaware Supreme Court and were thus 
procedurally barred, and the District Court rejected Riley's 
remaining arguments regarding this matter on the merits. 
On appeal, Riley attacks both parts of the District Court's 
holding. 
 
A. 
 
Riley contends that the District Court was required to 
hold an evidentiary hearing on the question of procedural 
default for two reasons. First, he maintains that at least 
some of the arguments that the District Court held were 
procedurally barred might have been presented to the 
Delaware Supreme Court during the oral argument of his 
direct appeal even though those arguments were not 
contained in his brief. Because the record does not include 
a transcript of the oral argument, Riley maintains that the 
District Court should have held an evidentiary hearing for 
the purpose of reconstructing the record. See  Appellant's 
Br. at 38-39. We disagree. 
 
On direct appeal, Riley was represented by the same 
attorney who had represented him at trial. In his amended 
habeas petition, Riley acknowledges that no ineffective 
assistance argument was made in the direct appeal brief 
that was ultimately submitted on his behalf and accepted 
for filing by the Delaware Supreme Court.2  See App. 1198. 
In addition, the opinion issued by the Delaware Supreme 
Court in the direct appeal makes no mention of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. See Riley I. Under these 
circumstances, the District Court was certainly not 
required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine 
whether the attorney who represented Riley at trial chose at 
oral argument before the state supreme court to make 
arguments not mentioned in his brief and to condemn his 
own performance in the trial court. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The first brief submitted by Riley's attorney on direct appeal 
contained 
a conclusory passage that purported to raise the issue of ineffective 
assistance (without any factual elaboration) for the purpose of preserving 
the issue. See App. 1198. However, this brief was rejected by the 
Delaware Supreme Court, and the brief that was ultimately submitted 
and accepted contained no such passage. See App. 1198-99. 
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With little elaboration, Riley also contends that the 
District Court should have held an evidentiary hearing so 
that Riley could show that he had "cause" for not raising 
the arguments in question in state court. See  Appellant's 
Br. at 39. However, Riley has not even identified any 
"cause" that he would have attempted to show. We will not 
reverse the decision of the District Court and order that 
Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing so that Riley can 
develop the factual predicate for a "cause" that Riley has 
not even disclosed. 
 
Perhaps the most frequently asserted "cause" for 
procedural default is ineffective assistance of counsel, and 
we will therefore comment briefly on the steps that Riley 
should have taken if he wished to rely on this "cause." As 
the District Court pointed out, in order for Riley to show 
that ineffective assistance provided "cause" for failing to 
raise the arguments in question in the state court 
proceedings, Riley would have to show that the new 
attorney who represented him in the state post-conviction 
relief proceedings was ineffective. See Dist. Ct. Op. at 50 & 
n.16, 56-57. This is so because Delaware permits a claim of 
ineffective assistance to be raised in a post-conviction relief 
proceeding even if it was not raised on direct appeal. See 
Riley VI, 1998 WL 172856, at **17-18 & n.16. 3 
 
Riley has not argued, however, that the attorney who 
represented him in the state post-conviction relief 
proceedings provided ineffective assistance by failing to 
make the specific arguments that the District Court held 
were procedurally barred.4 Moreover, because Riley never 
raised a claim in state court that his post-conviction relief 
attorney was ineffective, he runs afoul of the rule that "a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Indeed, in Riley's case, ineffective assistance was vigorously argued 
in 
the post-conviction relief proceedings, and the Delaware Supreme Court 
addressed these arguments on the merits. See Riley V, 585 A.2d at 726- 
29. 
 
4. Even if Riley had asserted a "cause" for the procedural default, he 
would have to confront the rule that a habeas petitioner is not entitled 
to an evidentiary hearing in federal court to establish a factual record 
unless the petitioner can show "cause" for not making the necessary 
factual record in the state proceedings. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 
504 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1992). 
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petitioner must demonstrate independent cause and 
prejudice excusing the default of the ineffectiveness claim 
before that claim can be assessed as cause in relation to a 
second, substantive claim." Hill v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1015, 
1030 (11th Cir. 1996). See also Justus v. Murray , 897 F.2d 
709, 713 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 
B. 
 
We will now discuss the ineffective assistance arguments 
that were not procedurally defaulted. In order to show that 
his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel was 
violated at the penalty phase, Riley must satisfy the two- 
pronged test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984). First, he must demonstrate that his attorney"made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
`counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment." Id. at 687. "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's 
performance must be highly deferential. It is all too 
tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's 
assistance after . . . [an] adverse sentence, and it is all too 
easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has 
proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or 
omission of counsel was unreasonable." Id. at 689. Second, 
if counsel's representation is shown to fall outside"the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance," id., it must be 
shown that "the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense," that is, that "there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different." Id . at 694. 
 
1. In his brief in our court, Riley presented a greatly 
truncated version of arguments previously advanced 
regarding trial counsel's failure to call certain family 
members to testify at the penalty phase of the trial and trial 
counsel's failure to locate or contact other family members 
who might have testified. All of these family members, Riley 
argues, could have provided evidence about his traumatic 
experiences as a child and his "severely dysfunctional 
family." Appellant's Br. at 41. 
 
The Superior Court, the Delaware Supreme Court, and 
the District Court all addressed these arguments in some 
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detail and rejected them. They concluded that Riley's trial 
attorney made reasonable efforts to find certain family 
members who could not be located, that he did not act 
unreasonably in failing to call others as witnesses, and that 
his failure to rely on what was termed Riley's "social 
history" represented a reasonable strategy. See Riley II, 
1988 WL 47076 at *3-4, *7-9; Riley V, 585 A.2d at 726-28; 
Riley VI, 1998 WL 172856, at **20-23. 
 
In his brief in our court, Riley merely states without 
elaboration that "trial counsel failed to call as witnesses 
members of Mr. Riley's immediate family, several of whom 
lived within a few hours of Dover, Delaware" and that these 
witnesses could have testified about his childhood and 
family. Appellant's Br. at 41. He provides no response to 
the detailed reasons given by the state courts and the 
District Court for holding that trial counsel was not 
ineffective in failing to call or locate family members for the 
purpose of eliciting testimony about Riley's childhood and 
family. 
 
Nothing has been presented that convinces us that the 
state courts and the District Court erred. We agree with the 
state courts and the District Court that Riley has not 
shown that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call 
those family members who could be located, such as Riley's 
mother. The District Court analyzed trial counsel's decision 
not to put Riley's mother on the stand as follows: 
 
        The record is replete with circumstances that 
       support trial counsel's decision not to call Petitioner's 
       mother. First, Petitioner informed trial counsel that he 
       did not wish to expose his mother's problems at trial. 
       . . . Second, trial counsel testified that Petitioner's 
       mother refused to support Petitioner's alibi, and as a 
       result, he was concerned about the prosecutor's cross- 
       examination of her during the penalty phase. . . . 
       Third, the record indicates that Petitioner's mother had 
       a severe drinking problem and was drinking heavily at 
       the time of the trial. . . . As a result, trial counsel 
       believed that the witnesses that he chose to call in 
       mitigation, instead, would make a better impression on 
       the jury. . . . Under these circumstances, the Court 
       finds trial counsel's decision not to call Petitioner's 
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       mother to be reasonable and within the bounds of his 
       strategic discretion. 
 
Riley VI, 1998 WL 172856, at *2. We agree. 
 
We also agree that Riley has not demonstrated that his 
trial attorney was ineffective in failing to locate certain 
other family members. See Riley II, **3-5; Riley V, 585 A.2d 
at 727-28; Riley VI, 1998 WL 172856, at *21. Finally, we 
agree that a strategy of not introducing evidence regarding 
Riley's background and family fell within "the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
689. The Superior Court wrote as follows: 
 
       The adverse inferences to be drawn from the fact that 
       defendant's parents were both alcoholics, his sister an 
       unwed mother of three, his brother an incarcerated 
       criminal and his home life a series of jails and 
       temporary living quarters would no doubt have been 
       magnified in the semi-rural county where this case was 
       tried . . . . Likewise, it is certainly within the range of 
       strategic choices to forego mitigating evidence, which 
       may be seen as "excuse making" and rely upon a plea 
       for mercy . . . . In Riley's case, evidence offered as to 
       mitigating circumstances included: that the actual 
       killer was Tyrone Baxter, the co-defendant; that Baxter 
       received a less severe penalty; and that Riley's 
       background indicated that he was a diligent worker, 
       possessing a non-violent and good character. 
 
       In this case, trial counsel gave a strong argument that 
       Riley's life should be spared in light of the fact that 
       Tyrone Baxter, defendant's accomplice and principal 
       accuser, would be spared the death penalty as the 
       result of a plea bargain. Moreover, Walter Ross testified 
       without contradiction at the [post-conviction relief] 
       hearing that the defendant did not want his family 
       background discussed at the penalty phase. Given 
       defendant's wishes, the lack of positive evidence in 
       mitigation, counsel's focused argument for leniency in 
       light of Baxter's plea bargain, and the potentially 
       negative impact the purportedly positive evidence 
       would have wrought before the jury, defendant has 
       failed to show that counsel's decision to limit the 
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       testimony at the penalty phase was constitutionally 
       deficient. 
 
Riley II, 1988 WL 47076, at *11-12. This analysis was 
accepted by the Delaware Supreme Court and the District 
Court. We cannot disagree. 
 
2. Riley contends that his trial attorney was ineffective 
because he did not present testimony by a mental health 
expert. Riley relies on the affidavits of two experts, who 
examined him in connection with the post-conviction relief 
proceeding. One of the experts characterized Riley as a 
person with "borderline defective" intelligence whose 
capacity "for objectively analyzing events, circumstances 
and relationships [is] narrowed by stress and complexity." 
Appellant's Br. at 42. We agree with Riley that this 
explanation might have been helpful at the penalty phase. 
The question remains, however, whether trial counsel was 
ineffective in failing to obtain such evidence at the time. 
 
In the post-conviction relief proceeding in Superior Court, 
trial counsel testified that he did not seek to have Riley 
examined by a mental health expert because he had no 
reason to think, in light of his conversations with Riley, 
that such an examination would have revealed anything 
useful. See App. 592-96. He testified that Riley appeared to 
understand what they discussed and that Riley prepared 
and filed some motions on his own behalf. See  App. 592- 
93. Trial counsel stated that Riley never mentioned any 
head injury or any psychological problems. See  App. 590. 
Relying on this testimony, the Superior Court found that 
trial counsel "had no inkling that evaluation of Mr. Riley's 
mental or emotional state might be helpful in mitigation." 
Riley II, 1988 WL 47076, at *7. 
 
Before us, Riley has not argued that counsel in a capital 
case must always seek a mental examination of the 
defendant, and cases from other circuits reject that 
proposition. Instead, they hold that a case-by-case 
determination must be made and that counsel is not 
ineffective if he or she has no reason to think that a mental 
examination would be useful. See Thomas v. Gilmore, 144 
F.3d 513, 515-16 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Miller, 
907 F.2d 994, 998-99 (10th Cir. 1990); United States ex rel. 
Rivera v. Franzen, 794 F.2d 314, 317 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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Under this standard, we see no ground for reversing the 
decision of the District Court here. Riley has simply not 
identified any fact that should have alerted his trial 
attorney that he had mental problems that might have 
provided the basis for mitigation. The only fact even 
mentioned in Riley's briefs is the "implausible" nature of 
Riley's alibi, see Reply Br. at 21, but this is insufficient to 
alert counsel to the possibility of mental problems that 
might be relevant to mitigation. For the most part, Riley 
merely notes what the subsequent examinations by mental 
health experts revealed. However, "[a] fair assessment of 
attorney performance requires that every effort be made to 
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct 
the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to 
evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the 
time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
 
3. Finally, Riley cites trial counsel's inexperience and 
the fact that he spent only 14 hours preparing for the 
penalty phase of the trial. These facts are not comforting, 
but they do not in themselves establish that counsel was 
ineffective. We have taken them into account in evaluating 
the other deficiencies properly asserted in this appeal. We 
cannot say, however, that Riley's constitutional right to the 
effective assistance of counsel was denied. 
 
VI. 
 
Relying on Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1985), 
Riley argues that his right to due process was violated 
because the trial judge refused to appoint co-counsel or an 
investigator to assist his attorney. Riley again notes the 
inexperience of his attorney, and he asserts that co-counsel 
had been appointed in Kent County in prior capital cases. 
Although Riley claims that the lack of co-counsel and an 
investigator caused him "extreme prejudice," his brief 
provides no details. 
 
A. We turn first to Riley's argument that he was 
constitutionally entitled to the appointment of co-counsel. 
In some jurisdictions, there is a statutory right to the 
appointment of two defense attorneys in capital cases. See, 
e.g., 18 U.S.C. S 3005. However, we are aware of no 
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authority holding that the federal Constitution confers such 
a right, and we see no basis for such a holding. The 
Constitution specifies the quality of representation that all 
criminal defendants, including capital defendants, must 
receive, namely, "reasonably effective assistance." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The Constitution does not 
specify the number of lawyers who must be appointed. If a 
single attorney provides reasonably effective assistance, the 
Constitution is satisfied, and if a whole team of lawyers 
fails to provide such assistance, the Constitution is 
violated. Thus, there is no constitutional right per se to the 
appointment of co-counsel in a capital case. Bell v. 
Watkins, 692 F.2d 999, 1009 (5th Cir. 1982); Jimenez v. 
State, 703 So. 2d 437, 439 (Fla. 1997) (per curiam); State 
v. Phelps, 478 S.E.2d 563, 574-75 (W.Va. 1996) (per 
curiam); State v. Rodriguez, 921 P.2d 643, 652 (Ariz. 1996); 
Spranger v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1117, 1122-23 (Ind. 1995); 
Uptergrove v. State, 881 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1994). Cf. Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1456 (10th 
Cir. 1995). 
 
Riley's brief does not identify any unusual features of this 
case that demanded the appointment of a second attorney. 
While he does cite the inexperience of his trial attorney, 
without a showing that this attorney did not provide the 
level of representation required by the Constitution, we 
cannot hold that the failure to appoint co-counsel to assist 
him violated the Constitution. 
 
B. We must also reject Riley's argument that the failure 
to appoint a private investigator violated the Constitution. 
In Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (1985), 
the Supreme Court made it clear that there is no 
constitutional right to the appointment of an investigator 
where the defendant offers "little more than undeveloped 
assertions that the requested assistance would be 
beneficial." See also Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 59, 66-67 
(4th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Gray v. 
Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996). Riley has offered nothing 
more here. 
 
. . . 
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VIII. 
 
Riley contends that the trial judge contravened the 
holding of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), 
when the judge dismissed two jurors for cause after they 
responded to voir dire questions concerning capital 
punishment. In Witherspoon, the Supreme Court held that 
members of a jury panel may not be excused for cause 
"simply because they voiced general objections to the death 
penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples 
against its infliction." Id. at 522. Some lower courts, 
however, interpreted footnotes in Witherspoon  to mean that 
potential jurors could be dismissed only if they stated 
unambiguously that they would automatically vote against 
the death penalty.5 
 
The Supreme Court clarified the meaning of Witherspoon 
in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). The Court held 
that "the proper standard for determining when a 
prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his 
or her views on capital punishment . . . is whether the 
juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his 
instructions and his oath.' " Id. at 424 (quoting 
Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 45). The Court noted: 
 
       [T]his standard . . . does not require that a juror's bias 
       be proved with `unmistakable clarity' . . . because 
       determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to 
       question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in 
       the manner of a catechism. What common sense 
       should have realized experience has proved: many 
       veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to 
       reach the point where their bias has been made 
       "unmistakably clear"; these veniremen may not know 
       how they will react when faced with imposing the death 
       sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish 
       to hide their true feelings. Despite this lack of clarity in 
       the printed record, however, there will be situations 
       where the trial judge is left with the definite impression 
       that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully 
       and impartially apply the law. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 419 (1985). 
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Id. at 424-26 (footnote omitted). The Court went on to hold 
that a trial judge's finding under this standard is entitled to 
the presumption of correctness in 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d).6 469 
U.S. at 428. Applying these standards, the Court sustained 
the dismissal of a juror who said, when asked whether her 
beliefs would interfere with her sitting as a juror in a 
capital case, "I am afraid it would" and "I think it would." 
Id. at 416. 
 
The two potential jurors at issue in the present case are 
Mae Floyd and Gerald Mood. During Floyd's voir dire, the 
following exchange occurred: 
 
        The Court: . . . Do you have any conscientious 
       scruples against finding a verdict of guilty where the 
       punishment might be death or against imposing the 
       death penalty if the evidence should so warrant? 
 
       Ms. Floyd: I would say yes, I think so.  
 
       The Court: You do have conscientious scruples? 
 
       Ms. Floyd: Yes.  
 
       The Court: Regardless of any personal beliefs or 
       feelings you have, if the evidence justified it, would you 
       be able to find a person guilty of murder in the first 
       degree and impose the death penalty? 
 
       Ms. Floyd: That is a hard one to tell you the truth. 
 
       The Court: I will repeat the question. 
 
       Ms. Floyd: I heard it. All right. Repeat the question. 
 
       The Court: I will repeat it. Regardless of your 
       personal belief or feelings, if the evidence justified it, 
       would you be able to find a person guilty of murder in 
       the first degree and would you be able to impose the 
       death penalty? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. See also Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1498 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)("a trial court may excuse a 
juror for cause where such juror's views would prevent or substantially 
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his 
instructions and his oath. . . . [and] that a state trial judge's finding 
that 
a prospective juror is impermissibly biased against the death penalty is 
entitled to a presumption of correctness under S 28 U.S.C.A. 2254(d)."). 
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       Ms. Floyd: That is a two-part question, right? 
 
       The Court: Yes, it is. 
 
       Ms. Floyd: The latter part-- 
 
       The Court: First of all, would you be able to find a 
       person guilty of murder in the first degree? 
 
       Ms. Floyd: I may, yes. 
 
       The Court: And the second part is would you be 
       able to impose the death penalty? 
 
       Ms. Floyd: I tell you the truth I don't think so. 
 
       The Court: I will excuse you. Thank you very much. 
 
App. 285-86 (emphasis added). 
 
As both the Delaware Supreme Court and the District 
Court observed, Floyd's responses were very similar to 
those of the potential juror in question in Wainwright v. 
Witt, supra. See Riley I, 496 A.2d at 1005-06 Riley VI, 1998 
WL 172856, at *11. We agree with their analysis and hold 
that Riley has not overcome the presumption of correctness 
that attaches to the implicit finding of the trial judge. 
 
The dismissal of the other potential juror in question, 
Gerald Mood, took place after the following colloquy: 
 
       The Court: . . . . Do you have any conscientious 
       scruples against finding a verdict of guilty when the 
       punishment might be death or against imposing the 
       death penalty if the evidence should so warrant? 
 
       Mr. Mood: I don't know. I have mixed emotions about 
       that. 
 
       The Court: Regardless of any personal belief or 
       feelings that you have, if the evidence justified it, would 
       you be able to find a person guilty of murder in the 
       first degree and would you be able to impose the death 
       penalty? 
 
       Mr. Mood: Maybe I could. I don't really know. 
 
       The Court: I am going to excuse you sir . . . . 
 
App. 276. 
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The District Judge aptly analyzed the dismissal of Mood, 
and we adopt his analysis:7 
 
       Unlike venireperson Floyd, venireperson Mood's 
       responses were much more succinct. Mood twice 
       responded to the trial court's capital punishment 
       questions with the phrase, "I don't know." . .. . 
       Particularly in situations such as this, where an 
       individual's record response is so brief that its printed 
       reproduction reveals little, the Court should defer to 
       those credibility factors that would only have been 
       known to the trial court, such as the juror's demeanor, 
       tone of voice and attitude. See Witt, 469 U.S. at 434 
       (emphasizing importance of trial court's assessment of 
       venireperson's demeanor, particularly where printed 
       record may not be "crystal clear"). Accordingly, the 
       Court finds adequate record support for the trial 
       court's decision to excuse venireperson Mood. 
 
Riley VI, 1998 WL 172856, at *12. 
 
IX. 
 
Relying on Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992), Riley 
argues that the trial judge erred in failing sua sponte to ask 
prospective jurors during voir dire whether they would 
automatically impose the death penalty if they found him 
guilty. The District Court rejected this claim on the ground 
that Morgan requires that such questions be asked only if 
the defense so requests. We agree. 
 
In Morgan, the Supreme Court framed the relevant issue 
in these terms: "whether on voir dire the court must, on 
defendant's request, inquire into the prospective jurors' 
views on capital punishment." 504 U.S. at 726 (emphasis 
added). The Court stated its holding as follows: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In addition, as the District Court noted, some of the answers given by 
Floyd and Mood to questions not concerning capital punishment may 
have influenced the trial judge's decision to dismiss them. Floyd revealed 
that she knew Tyrone Baxter and was a casual friend of Baxter's mother. 
Mood said that he was a good friend of one of the police officers involved 
in the case and had served with him in the fire department. See Riley VI, 
1998 WL 172856, at *12. 
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       Petitioner was entitled, upon his request, to inquiry 
       discerning those jurors who, even prior to the State's 
       case in chief, had predetermined the terminating issue 
       of his trial, that being whether to impose the death 
       penalty. 
 
Id. at 736 (emphasis added). The dissent described the 
Court's holding in similar language: "The Court today holds 
that . . . the Constitution requires that voir dire directed to 
[reverse-Witherspoon] `bias' be provided upon the 
defendant's request." Id. at 739 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
 
We cannot regard the Court's choice of words as 
accidental, and we think that the holding of Morgan is 
clear: a reverse-Witherspoon inquiry must be made "on 
defendant's request." See United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 
861, 879 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 
Riley makes two arguments in response. First, he notes 
that the state supreme court rejected his argument on the 
merits, and he contends that "the State should not now be 
heard to raise alleged procedural bars to federal court 
resolution of the claim on the merits." Appellant's Br. at 52. 
Our holding, however, has nothing to do with a procedural 
bar, i.e., a state rule of procedure that bars a federal 
habeas court from reaching the merits of a federal claim. 
Rather, our holding is based on the fact that the 
constitutional right recognized in Morgan applies only if the 
defense makes a request for a reverse-Witherspoon inquiry. 
 
Second, Riley argues that his trial attorney was 
ineffective in failing to request reverse-Witherspoon 
questioning. However, this argument was not made in the 
state courts, and it is thus procedurally barred. 
 
X. 
 
Under 11 Del. C. S 4209(g)(2), the Delaware Supreme 
Court is required to undertake a proportionality review in 
death penalty cases. The statute mandates that the Court 
inquire into whether "the death penalty was either 
arbitrarily or capriciously imposed or recommended, or 
disproportionate to the penalty recommended or imposed in 
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similar cases." 11 Del. C. S 4209(g)(2)(a). In affirming Riley's 
death sentence, the Delaware Supreme Court examined 21 
cases, including five in which the death penalty was 
imposed. It found that Riley's case was comparable to the 
five death penalty cases (Whalen, Rush, Deputy, Flamer 
and Bailey), because they all involved 
 
       an unprovoked, cold-blooded murder of a helpless 
       person (or persons) committed upon victims lacking the 
       ability to defend themselves and solely for the purposes 
       of pecuniary gain (except in Whalen's case). In none of 
       these killings is there any evidence of provocation or of 
       homicide committed out of passion or rage. In each 
       case, except Whalen, the murder occurred in the court 
       of a robbery that was deliberately planned and carried 
       out with the use of deadly weapons. In each case, the 
       perpetrators of these crimes offered no extenuating 
       circumstance for taking the life of another. 
 
Riley I, 496 A.2d at 1027. 
 
Riley challenges this finding on two grounds. First, he 
points to the fact that two of the death sentences relied on 
-- Rush and Whalen -- had been vacated. Second, he 
argues that the remaining cases -- Deputy, Bailey, and 
Flamer -- do not furnish appropriate comparisons because 
each involved the killing of more than one person. He 
maintains that these errors violated the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
 
It is clear that proportionality review is not required by 
the federal Constitution. See Pulley v. Harris , 465 U.S. 37, 
50-51 (1984). Riley justifies advancing his proportionality 
argument in federal court on two grounds.8  First, he argues 
that the allegedly improper review resulted in a punishment 
that was "inherently disproportionate and, therefore, 
arbitrary and capricious" in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment. Appellant's Br. at 56. Second, he argues that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Ordinarily, federal habeas relief is not available for an error of 
state 
law: the habeas statute provides that a writ disturbing a state court 
judgment may issue only if a prisoner is in custody"in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. 
S 2241(c)(3). See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). 
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Delaware's failure to abide by its own statutory scheme for 
proportionality review violated due process. See Fetterly v. 
Paskett, 997 F.2d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir. 1993) ("the failure 
of a state to abide by its own statutory commands may 
implicate a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment against arbitrary deprivation by a state"). 
 
Riley bases his first argument on the principle that"[i]f a 
State has determined that death should be an available 
penalty for certain crimes, then it must administer the 
penalty in a way that can rationally distinguish between 
those individuals for whom death is an appropriate 
sanction and those for whom it is not." Spaziano v. Florida, 
468 U.S. 447, 460 (1984). Riley claims that the 
proportionality review conducted by the Delaware Supreme 
Court in his case failed to protect him from arbitrary 
imposition of the death penalty, and in fact upheld a 
disproportionate punishment. This argument rests on the 
premise that applying the death penalty in Riley's case 
would be so disproportionate as to constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 
Therefore, Riley's argument really attacks the imposition of 
the penalty itself, rather than the state's method of 
reviewing proportionality. 
 
Riley's argument is not tenable. The Supreme Court has 
"occasionally struck down punishments as inherently 
disproportionate, and therefore cruel and unusual, when 
imposed for a particular crime or category of crime." Pulley, 
465 U.S. at 43. However, in this case, Riley's crime-- 
killing a defenseless person without provocation in the 
course of an armed robbery -- is not such that application 
of the death penalty in these circumstances would"shock 
the conscience." See Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d 1137, 1154 
(11th Cir. 1987); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 
606 n.28 (5th Cir. 1976). Riley has thus failed to show an 
Eighth Amendment violation. 
 
Riley's second argument is based on the principle that 
when a state creates a right, the Due Process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment entitles a defendant to procedures 
to ensure that the right is not arbitrarily denied. He argues 
that the Delaware Supreme Court, by failing to conduct an 
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adequate proportionality review as required by state 
statute, denied him due process. 
 
As a threshold matter, it is unclear whether, under Third 
Circuit law, a state proportionality-review statute creates 
any cognizable liberty interest for due process purposes. 
See Frey v. Fulcomer, 132 F.3d 916, 925 n.7 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(noting that Supreme Court precedent on this issue is in 
flux). We need not address this question, however, because 
even if Riley has such a liberty interest, he has not shown 
any denial of due process. In evaluating a claim that a state 
court erred in conducting its proportionality review, a 
federal court may only inquire into whether the state court 
"undertook its proportionality review in good faith and 
found that [the defendant's] sentence was proportional to 
the sentences imposed in cases similar to his." Walton v. 
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656 (1990). Because there is no 
federal constitutional right to proportionality review, if the 
federal court finds that the review was undertaken in good 
faith, it cannot "look behind" the state court's conclusion of 
proportionality to consider whether the state court 
misapplied state proportionality law. See id.; Bannister v. 
Delo, 100 F.3d 610, 627 (8th Cir. 1996). In this case, the 
Delaware Supreme Court compared Riley's case with a 
substantial number of other death-eligible cases, and, even 
disregarding the two vacated death sentences, it found 
common characteristics between Riley's case and three 
other cases in which the sentence was not vacated. 
Although Riley argues that these cases are not entirely 
analogous, because each contained an additional 
aggravating factor (more than one victim), there is no 
indication that the Delaware court acted in bad faith in 
conducting its review. We are thus without power to order 
habeas relief. 
 
XI. 
 
We now turn to Riley's contentions concerning jury 
instructions given by the trial judge at the sentencing 
phase. 
 
A. 
 
Riley argues that the jury instructions at the penalty 
phase impermissibly restricted the jury's consideration of 
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mitigating circumstances. He takes issue with the following 
instruction, issued at the start of the penalty hearing: 
 
       A sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the 
       jury finds: 
 
       (1) Beyond a reasonable doubt at least one statutory 
       aggravating circumstance; and 
 
       (2) Unanimously recommends, after weighing all 
       relevant evidence in aggravation or mitigation 
       which bears upon the particular circumstances or 
       details of the commission of the offense and the 
       character and propensities of the offender, that a 
       sentence of death shall be imposed. Where the 
       jury submits such a finding and recommendation, 
       the Court shall sentence the defendant to death. A 
       finding by the jury of a statutory aggravating 
       circumstance, and a consequent recommendation of 
       death, supported by the evidence, shall be binding 
       on the Court. 
 
App. 392 (emphasis added). Riley contends that, given the 
placement of the word "consequent," "a reasonable jury 
could understand the underscored sentence to mean that 
the effect of a finding that a statutory aggravating 
circumstance existed, is that the death penalty must be 
imposed." Appellant's Br. 59. Because the trial judge had 
previously informed the jury that the statutory aggravating 
circumstance -- commission of the murder during a 
robbery -- had already been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt in the guilt phase, Riley argues that a reasonable 
jury could have read the instruction to mean that it need 
not consider mitigation evidence. 
 
When reviewing a jury instruction that is claimed to 
impermissibly restrict a jury's consideration of relevant 
evidence, a court must ask "whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged 
instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of 
constitutionally relevant evidence." Boyde v. California, 494 
U.S. 370, 380 (1990). If there is "only a possibility" of such 
inhibition, however, the challenge must fail. Id . Moreover, 
the challenged instructions "must be evaluated not in 
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isolation but in the context of the entire charge." Jones v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 373, 391 (1999). 
 
When the jury charge is read as a whole, there is no 
reasonable likelihood that a jury could have understood it 
to preclude consideration of mitigating circumstances. At 
the close of the penalty hearing, the court again instructed 
the jury in terms that cleared up any ambiguity that might 
have been present in its earlier instruction: 
 
       In conclusion, a sentence of death shall not be imposed 
       unless you, the jury, find: 
 
       (1) Beyond a reasonable doubt at least one statutory 
       aggravating circumstance has been established; 
       and 
 
       (2) Unanimously recommend that a sentence of death 
       be imposed after weighing all relevant evidence in 
       aggravation and mitigation which bear upon the 
       particular circumstances and details of the 
       commission of the offense and the character and 
       propensities of the offender. 
 
       Should you fail to agree unanimously to either of these 
       two matters, the Court shall sentence the defendant to 
       life imprisonment without benefit of probation or 
       parole. 
 
App. 438-40 (emphasis added). 
 
This instruction made it clear that a jury was required 
both to find at least one statutory aggravator and to weigh 
aggravating factors against mitigating factors in order to 
support a death sentence. This belies Riley's argument that 
the jury was misled into believing that its job was done 
once the felony murder aggravator was found. 
 
B. 
 
Riley next takes issue with the trial court's failure at the 
penalty phase to instruct the jury that it was required to 
conclude unanimously that aggravating circumstances 
outweigh mitigating circumstances before imposing death, 
as required by Delaware law. See Whalen v. State , 492 A.2d 
552, 560 (Del. 1985) (setting forth "outweighing" standard). 
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Rather, the court simply instructed the jury that it had to 
"[u]nanimously recommend that a sentence of death be 
imposed after weighing all relevant evidence in aggravation 
and mitigation." App. 438; see also App. 392, 437. 
 
This argument provides no grounds for habeas relief. The 
federal Constitution does not require "specific standards for 
balancing aggravating against mitigating circumstances." 
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 876 n.13 (1983). As long as 
a jury is permitted to consider all relevant mitigating 
circumstances in making its death recommendation, there 
is no federal constitutional problem. In addition, Riley has 
not suggested how a jury's decision would be any different 
under the language the court used in this case. Because 
the jury was instructed not to make a sentencing 
recommendation until after it had "weigh[ed] all relevant 
evidence in aggravation and mitigation," the necessary 
inference was that the death penalty should be imposed 
only if aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors 
(otherwise, the entire "weighing" process would be 
meaningless). 
 
C. 
 
Finally, Riley argues that the penalty phase instructions 
improperly suggested that the jury had to be unanimous in 
imposing a life sentence, in violation of Whalen v. State, 
492 A.2d 552, 562 (Del. 1985). He points to the instruction 
that "[i]f you are not unanimous in your recommendation to 
impose the death penalty, or you cannot agree unanimously 
as to your recommendation, then the Court is bound to 
impose a sentence of life." App. 438 (emphasis added). The 
word "recommendation" in the underlined phrase, he 
suggests, could be read to refer to a life sentence 
recommendation as well as to a recommendation of death. 
 
As a threshold issue, the government argues that Riley 
failed to raise this issue before the District Court because 
he based his argument there "solely on the interpretation of 
the interrogatories posed to the jury" rather than on the 
jury instruction he points to here. Appellee's Br. at 75. 
However, Riley, although pointing specifically to the 
interrogatories to support his point, nevertheless raised the 
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general argument in his amended petition that "the 
instructions were likely to confuse the jury about whether 
the verdict must be unanimous." App. 1191. This is 
sufficient to preserve his argument before this Court. 
 
On the merits, however, Riley's claim must fail. First, 
when the jury charge is viewed as a whole, it reveals several 
instances in which the word "unanimous" was explicitly 
paired solely with the death recommendation. In light of 
this pattern, it appears unlikely that the jury would have 
viewed the isolated passage that Riley relies on as 
extending the unanimity requirement to a recommendation 
of life imprisonment. Second, the Delaware Supreme Court, 
in reviewing this allegation, stated that it was"satisfied that 
the jury understood that, in the event of its failure to 
unanimously agree upon imposition of a death penalty, an 
imposition of life imprisonment would result." Riley V, 585 
A.2d at 725. Because the instruction made clear that the 
default rule in case of a lack of unanimity was life 
imprisonment, it is hard to see how the jury's deliberations 
would have been affected even had it adopted Riley's 
interpretation of the instruction. Finally, the challenged 
instruction was identical to one approved by the Delaware 
Supreme Court in Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104 (Del. 
1984), aff 'd sub nom. Flamer v. Delaware, 68 F.3d 710 (3d 
Cir. 1995) and Flamer v. Delaware, 68 F.2d 736 (3d Cir. 
1995) (en banc). The Delaware Supreme Court explicitly 
pointed to the similarities with Flamer, and distinguished 
the instructions from those in Whalen, in upholding the 
death sentence on direct appeal. See Riley, 585 A.2d at 
722-25. For these reasons, we reject Riley's claim. 
 
XII. 
 
Riley was convicted of intentional murder and felony 
murder, with the underlying felony being first-degree 
robbery. The statutory aggravating circumstance relied on 
for the death sentence was that the murder was committed 
while Riley was engaged in the commission of first degree 
robbery. See 11 Del. C. S 4209(e)(1)(j) (establishing felony 
murder aggravator). Riley argues that it is unconstitutional 
to double-count robbery as both an element of the crime 
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(felony murder) that made Riley death-eligible and as a 
statutory aggravating circumstance. 
 
This Court rejected precisely the same claim in Deputy v. 
Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485,1502 (3d Cir. 1994), holding that 
"within the context of Delaware's death penalty statute, the 
provision requiring the double-counting of the felony at the 
guilty phase and sentencing phase does not impermissibly 
weaken the statute's constitutionally mandated narrowing 
function." This precedent binds our panel. 
 
XIII. 
 
Riley's final argument is that the District Court erred in 
denying his motion for funds for investigative and expert 
assistance and in refusing to conduct an evidentiary 
hearing. We disagree. 
 
A. 
 
Under 18 U.S.C. S 3006A(e) and 21 U.S.C. S 848(q)(4)(B) 
and (9), Riley was entitled to investigative and expert 
assistance upon a finding that such assistance was 
"necessary" or "reasonably necessary" with respect to his 
representation in the habeas proceeding. Riley sought the 
services of an investigator to gather additional evidence 
concerning his childhood experiences. He sought the 
services of a forensic psychiatrist to develop further 
mitigating evidence concerning his mental problems. All of 
these services were requested in order to support Riley's 
arguments that his trial attorney was ineffective at the 
penalty phase and that the trial judge should have 
appointed a co-counsel and investigator to assist him. 
 
Riley has not shown that the services in question were 
"necessary" or "reasonably necessary." The discovery at the 
time of the federal habeas proceeding of new evidence about 
Riley's childhood would not have shown that the efforts of 
Riley's trial attorney to locate family members who might 
have testified about such matters were objectively 
unreasonable. See pages 38-41, supra. Nor would the 
discovery of such evidence have demonstrated that it was 
strategically unreasonable for Riley's trial attorney to 
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eschew a penalty-phase defense based on Riley's"social 
history." See id. Similarly, the development of additional 
evidence regarding Riley's mental condition at the time of 
the federal habeas proceeding would not have shown that 
Riley's trial attorney was objectively unreasonable in not 
seeking a mental examination prior to the penalty. See 
pages 41-43, supra. 
 
B. 
 
"Where the District Court denies the petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the absence of an evidentiary hearing," we 
ask, first, "whether the petitioner asserts facts which entitle 
him to relief " and, second, "whether an evidentiary hearing 
is needed." Todaro v. Fulcomer, 944 F.2d 1079, 1082 (3d 
Cir. 1991). See also Heiser v. Ryan, 951 F.2d 559, 561 (3d 
Cir. 1991). Riley argues that the District Court should have 
held an evidentiary hearing concerning the prosecution's 
peremptory challenges, the impartiality of the jury, his 
Brady claim, and other unspecified issues. We disagree. As 
previously discussed, we are required to accept the state 
courts' findings regarding the peremptory challenges and 
the impartiality of the jury, and those findings are 
dispositive. Thus, an evidentiary hearing in federal court on 
those matters was not needed. In addition, in light of the 
revelation after briefing that no conversation in which 
Baxter participated is listed in the logs of the wiretap on 
Mrs. Baxter's telephone, it is clear that there was no need 
for an evidentiary hearing concerning Riley's Brady claim. 
Nor do we believe that the District Court was an evidentiary 
hearing was needed on any other matter. 
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BECKER, Chief Judge, Concurring in the Judgment. 
 
This en banc appeal ultimately turns on the petitioner's 
Batson claim. Unfortunately, I find myself unable to join in 
either Judge Sloviter's or Judge Alito's opinion on that issue.1 
 
First, I cannot agree with Judge Sloviter's treatment of 
the prosecution's challenge to prospective juror Nichols. 
Rather, I agree with Judge Alito's opinion on this issue, see 
Dis. Op. at 83-91, largely because I do not share Judge 
Sloviter's skepticism of the prosecutor's testimony as to 
Nichols's "significant pause." Human memory can be quite 
powerful, and I think it entirely possible that this 
"significant pause" became indelibly etched in the 
prosecutor's mind. As explicated by the dissent, the hearing 
judge determined that the prosecutor's testimony on this 
matter was credible, and I cannot agree that the race- 
neutral reason proffered for striking Nichols was"not fairly 
supported by the record." 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(8) (1988). 
 
On the other hand, while the point is quite close, I 
cannot bring myself to join Judge Alito's discussion of the 
challenge to prospective juror McGuire. Unlike the 
challenge to Nichols, an action for which the prosecutor 
relied on his memory to articulate a race-neutral 
explanation, the prosecutor had no recollection whatsoever 
about the differences between McGuire and Reed. I 
therefore agree with Judge Sloviter that there is no basis in 
the record for distinguishing McGuire, a prospective black 
juror who was struck, from Reed, a white man who was not 
struck and who ultimately served on the jury. While ideally 
this issue would be developed further at a federal habeas 
hearing, I reluctantly conclude, again agreeing with Judge 
Sloviter, that no purpose would be served by having such 
a hearing at this late date. Accordingly, I will join in the 
judgment accompanying her opinion. 
 
While I might end at this point, I am impelled to 
comment on the statistical evidence by reason of the 
prominent discussion of the issue in the Sloviter and Alito 
opinions, and the fact that Judge Alito's dissent identifies 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. I do, however, join in Part II of Judge Alito's opinion, dealing with 
the 
Caldwell issue. 
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significant problems with Judge Sloviter's discussion of that 
evidence. I feel myself unable to join in Judge Alito's 
opinion on that facet of the case for he has not allayed my 
concern about the practices of the Kent County 
prosecutor's office at times relevant here. Specifically, the 
absence of black jurors on four juries in a county that was 
18% black and had a jury venire that was 9% black 
remains troubling. As the Supreme Court has observed in 
other contexts when presented with perhaps imperfect 
statistical data, "[F]ine tuning of the statistics could not 
have obscured the glaring absence of minoriti[ies]. . . . [T]he 
. . . inability to rebut the inference of discrimination came 
not from a misuse of statistics, but from the inexorable 
zero." Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 
342 n.23 (1977) (internal quotations omitted). 
 
This concern is exacerbated for me by the State's failure 
to submit rebuttal evidence. If Riley's data was too weak to 
support an inference of discrimination in the face of the 
prosecutor's race-neutral explanations, there was no 
burden on the government to submit rebuttal data. 
However, as Judge Sloviter's discussion of the chronology of 
events makes clear, the State volunteered to provide 
rebuttal data, and then failed to do so. See Op. of the Court 
at 38. If the hearing judge had acknowledged the State's 
failure to provide evidence notwithstanding its promise and 
then specifically said that he did not consider this failure to 
be sufficiently probative to overcome the credibility 
determination, his factual conclusion would be fait 
accompli. But the fact that the hearing judge did not 
mention the State's failure to provide evidence, in the wake 
of the "volunteering," sticks out like a sore thumb, and 
renders it doubtful for me that the "record as a whole" 
supports the hearing judge's conclusion. 
 
Judge Sloviter seems to concede that a federal habeas 
hearing would give Riley ample time to conduct an expert 
statistical analysis of the complete record, time which he 
lacked at the earlier hearing, as she explains, because of 
the State's late decision not to submit any statistical 
evidence. See Op. of the Court at 38. Were the statistical 
evidence dispositive of Riley's Batson claim, I would remand 
for a federal habeas hearing. Judge Sloviter, however, 
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states that the statistical evidence is "relevant but not 
dispositive to our decision." Op. of the Court at 40. Because 
I accept her representation on this matter, I do not press 
the issue further, and simply join in the judgment 
accompanying her opinion.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. I note that, even if I did not agree with Judge Sloviter on the juror 
McGuire issue, the judgment accompanying her opinion is plainly closer 
to my own position than the views of Judge Alito. Under these 
circumstances, I would vote with her anyhow to avoid a stalemate. See 
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 134 (1945) (Rutledge, J., 
concurring); see also Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 607-08 (1999) 
(Stevens, J., concurring); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 656 (1998) 
(Stevens, J., concurring); AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 
202, 225 (2d Cir. 2000) (Jacobs, J., concurring). 
 
 
                                81 
  
ALITO, Circuit Judge, with whom Judges SCIRICA, BARRY, 
FUENTES and STAPLETON join as to Part I, and with 
whom Chief Judge BECKER, and Judges BARRY, and 
STAPLETON join as to Part II, dissenting: 
 
This is a troubling case, but after considering all of the 
petitioner's arguments and applying the standard of review 
prescribed by the federal habeas statute, I see no ground 
for reversing the decision of the district court. The majority 
holds that the petitioner's rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79 (1986), were violated, but I do not believe that 
there is a proper basis for disturbing the credibility findings 
made by the conscientious state judge. The majority also 
holds that comments made by the prosecutor in closing 
argument at the penalty phase of the trial violated Caldwell 
v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), but in my view the 
majority misinterprets that decision as in effect embodying 
a per se prohibition against any mention of the availability 
of appellate review of a death sentence, a procedure of 
which virtually all jurors are surely aware. Because I 
cannot agree with the majority's analysis of either of these 
issues, I must respectfully dissent. 
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
I turn first to the argument that the prosecution violated 
Batson by using peremptory challenges to strike three 
African Americans from the jury panel. In Batson , the 
Supreme Court held that it is a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause for a prosecutor to strike a juror because 
of race. The Court also set out a three-step process for 
adjudicating a claim that a particular peremptory was 
racially based. 
 
       [O]nce the opponent of a peremptory challenge has 
       made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination 
       (step one), the burden of production shifts to the 
       proponent of the strike to come forward with a race- 
       neutral explanation (step two). If a race-neutral 
       explanation is tendered, the trial court must then 
       decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike 
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       has proved purposeful racial discrimination. Hernandez 
       v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-359 (1991)(plurality 
       opinion); id., at 375 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in 
       judgment); Batson, [476 U.S.] at 96-98. 
 
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995)(per curiam). 
 
In this case, the Superior Court found that the petitioner, 
William Riley, made out a prima facie case, see Riley v. 
State, No. 200, 1988 (Super. Ct. April 21, 1989) at 2, and 
the state does not dispute this point. The state offered race- 
neutral justifications for its contested strikes, and the state 
courts accepted those explanations and found that the 
disputed peremptories were not racially based. Id. at 3-6; 
Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719, 725 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1990). The 
majority however, rejects the state courts' findings 
regarding two of the state's peremptories and substitutes 
its own contrary findings. I will discuss each of the 
challenges on which the majority relies.1  
 
B: Ray Nichols 
 
1. The prosecutor testified that he struck Nichols 
because he was uncertain that Nichols would be able to 
vote for a death sentence. See App. 797-99. According to 
the prosecutor's testimony, "there was a pause and a 
significant pause in [his] answering [the trial judge's] 
inquiry and that to me was enough to suggest that he 
might not be able to return a death penalty." Id. Having 
heard the prosecutor's testimony, the judge who presided 
over the Batson hearing [hereinafter"the hearing judge"], 
concluded: "I find the State provided a credible, race- 
neutral reason for exercising its peremptory challenge after 
appraising the demeanor and credibility of the juror. The 
State's exercise of its peremptory challenge was non- 
discriminatory. I am satisfied that the peremptory challenge 
was not made on the ground of the juror's race." Id. at 889. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Riley also contends that a third member of the venire, Lois Beecher, 
was peremptorily challenged by the state because of race. The majority, 
however, does not rely on this strike, and accordingly I do not discuss 
it in this opinion. 
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Riley suggests that it is not believable that the prosecutor 
was able to remember at the time of the evidentiary hearing 
in 1988 that Nichols had paused while answering a 
question during voir dire six years earlier. In addition, Riley 
contrasts the prosecutor's ability to remember this pause 
with his inability to remember another potentially 
significant aspect of the jury selection process, and Riley 
notes that the prosecutor was a friend and neighbor of the 
victim. These facts were highlighted during the cross- 
examination of the prosecutor at the Batson hearing, see 
App. 820-29, and I agree that they were important factors 
to be considered in assessing the prosecutor's credibility. 
The hearing judge was aware of these facts and had the 
opportunity to observe the prosecutor testify on the witness 
stand. Despite these facts, however, the hearing judge 
found that the prosecutor's testimony was credible. 
 
Our standard of review of the hearing judge's finding is 
narrow. In Batson, the Supreme Court took pains to note 
that "[s]ince the trial judge's findings in the context under 
consideration here will largely turn on evaluation of 
credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those 
findings great deference." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21. In a 
later case applying Batson, the plurality elaborated: 
 
       In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the 
       decisive question will be whether counsel's race-neutral 
       explanation for a peremptory challenge should be 
       believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing 
       on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the 
       demeanor of the attorney who exercised the challenge. 
       . . . [E]valuation of the prosecutor's state of mind based 
       on demeanor and credibility lies `peculiarly within a 
       trial judge's province.' 
 
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 353 (1991) (pluralty) 
(citation omitted). 
 
Because the present case is a proceeding under the 
federal habeas statute, our scope of review is, if anything, 
even narrower. Under 28 U.S.C. S2254(d)(8)(1988 & Supp. 
1990), any state-court factual finding that is "fairly 
supported by the record" is entitled to a presumption of 
correctness. Discussing this provision, the Supreme Court 
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wrote in Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983), 
that "28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) gives federal habeas courts no 
license to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose 
demeanor has been observed by the state trial court, but 
not by them." Accord, Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 122 
n.6 (1983)(per curiam). The Marshall Court elaborated: 
 
       In United States v. Oregon Medical Society, 343 U.S. 
       326 (1952), commenting on the deference which this 
       Court gave to the findings of a District Court on direct 
       appeal from a judgment in a bench trial, we stated: 
 
       "As was aptly stated by the New York Court of 
       Appeals, although in a case of a rather different 
       substantive nature: `Face to face with living 
       witnesses the original trier of the facts holds a 
       position of advantage from which appellate judges 
       are excluded. In doubtful cases the exercise of his 
       power of observation often proves the most 
       accurate method of ascertaining the truth. . . . How 
       can we say the judge is wrong? We never saw the 
       witnesses. . . . To the sophistication and sagacity of 
       the trial judge the law confides the duty of 
       appraisal.' Boyd v. Boyd, 252 N.Y. 422, 429,169 
       N.E. 632." Id., at 339. 
 
       We greatly doubt that Congress, when it used the 
       language "fairly supported by the record" considered 
       "as a whole" intended to authorize broader federal 
       review of state court credibility determinations than are 
       authorized in appeals within the federal system itself. 
 
459 U.S. at 434. See also Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769. 
 
Under the very limited scope of review that applies here, 
I do not see how the hearing judge's finding that the 
prosecutor testified truthfully regarding the reason for 
challenging Nichols can be overturned. The hearing judge 
heard the prosecutor testify. He was aware of the factors 
noted above that provided grounds for doubting his 
testimony, but he nevertheless found that the prosecutor 
was truthful. I would sustain that finding. 
 
2. The majority rejects that finding (as well as the state 
courts' finding with respect to another prospective juror 
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whom I discuss below) in large part because, in the 
majority's view, "there is no basis to determine if the state 
courts undertook, or even were aware of, the required 
Batson step three inquiry." Maj. Op. at 36. In making this 
argument, the majority (a) misunderstands what Batson 
requires, (b) ignores what the Delaware courts did in this 
case, (c) imposes novel and unwarranted procedural 
requirements on the state courts, and (d) awards relief that 
extends beyond what its own logic warrants. 
 
What step three of Batson requires. Although the majority 
makes step three seem elaborate and elusive -- so elusive 
that, according to the majority, the Delaware courts may 
not have "fully appreciated the requirement" (Maj. Op. at 
32) -- step three, is neither conceptually difficult nor 
procedurally complicated. Step three simply requires the 
judge to make a finding of fact -- "to determine if the 
defendant has established purposeful discrimination," 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (footnote omitted). See also Purkett, 
514 U.S. at 767; Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-59 (plurality 
opinion); id. at 375 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
Neither Batson nor any subsequent Supreme Court or 
Third Circuit case has added to this requirement. 
 
What the Delaware courts did. The Delaware courts did 
exactly what step three requires. With respect to potential 
juror Nichols, the hearing judge, whose analysis the state 
supreme court endorsed, see 585 A.2d at 725, noted that 
the state had provided a race-neutral reason for the 
challenge, stated that he found the explanation credible, 
and concluded: "I am satisfied that the peremptory 
challenge was not made on the ground of the juror's  
race."2 This is precisely the finding that step three of 
Batson mandates. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (the court 
has "the duty to determine if the defendant has established 
purposeful discrimination"). 
 
What the majority requires. Although the majority opinion 
is loathe to admit it, what the majority really finds wanting 
in the opinions of the Delaware courts is not a failure to 
make the finding mandated by step three of the Batson 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The state courts' findings regarding the other potential juror at 
issue, 
Charles McGuire, are discussed below. See infra at 91-93. 
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inquiry but a failure to comment on the record regarding 
evidence that seems, in the majority's view, to undermine 
the prosecution's proffered explanations for the disputed 
peremptories. See Maj. Op. at 29 ("the state courts in this 
case rejected Riley's Batson claim without discussing any of 
the ample evidence that throws into question the 
explanations offered by the prosecutor for striking two of 
the black jurors . . . .").3 This approach is inconsistent with 
the federal habeas statute and Supreme Court precedent. 
 
The provision of the federal habeas statute on which the 
majority relies provides that if a state court's 
"determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual 
issue" is "evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or 
other reliable and adequate written indicia," that 
determination "shall be presumed to be correct" unless it is 
not "fairly supported by the record" as a whole. 28 U.S.C. 
S2254(d)(8)(1988 & Supp. 1990)(amended 1996). Under this 
provision, the state court's factual determination must 
simply be evidenced by "a written finding, written opinion, 
or other reliable and adequate written indicia," and it is not 
even necessary that a state court "specifically articulate its 
credibility findings." LaVallee v. Delle Rose , 410 U.S. 690, 
692 (1973). See also Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 
433. Thus, 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) plainly does not authorize 
us to disregard a state court's factual finding on the ground 
that the state court failed to discuss all the evidence or to 
explain why it was not persuaded by a particular piece of 
proof. 
 
I do not question that a judge, in making the factual 
finding required by step three of Batson, should consider all 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See, e.g., Maj Op. at 18 ("With regard to both Nichols and McGuire, 
the state courts failed to mention in their opinions the weaknesses in the 
State's explanations . . . ."); id. at 20 ("[T]he hearing judge discussed 
neither the statistics nor the State's failure to explain them[,] . . . 
overlooking and ignoring a significant segment of Riley's evidence . . . 
."); 
id. at 21 (hearing judge made no "reference to, or analysis of, Riley's 
evidence of pretext"); id. at 28 ("Here, the state courts failed to 
examine 
all of the evidence to determine whether the State's proffered race- 
neutral explanations were pretextual. Not only is there no indication on 
the record that the hearing judge engaged in the required analysis, but 
there is no indication that the Delaware Supreme Court did so."). 
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of the relevant evidence that has been adduced. But neither 
Batson nor any later Supreme Court or Third Circuit case4 
suggests that a federal habeas court is free to reject the 
factual findings of a state court if the state court does not 
comment on all of the evidence or provide what the federal 
court regards as a satisfactory explanation for its finding.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The only Third Circuit case cited in this connection by the majority 
(see Maj. Op. at 35) is Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960 (1993). Jones, 
however, was very different from the present case (see footnote nine, 
infra) and does not support the proposition that a finding of a state 
court 
is not entitled to the presumption of correctness if the state court did 
not 
explain why the court was not persuaded by particular items of evidence. 
 
5. Nor does the majority cite much other authority to support its 
position. See Maj. Op. at 28, 30, 34, 35. The majority (at 28) quotes 
dictum in a footnote in United States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 953 n.4 
(4th Cir. 1994)(emphasis added), to the effect that at step three of 
Batson 
"the court then addresses and evaluates all evidence introduced by each 
side." The reasons for not attaching too much weight to one word 
("addresses") in this statement are too obvious to require mention. 
 
The majority cites two federal habeas cases in which courts of appeals 
found great fault with the procedures used by state judges in 
adjudicating Batson objections. In Jordan v. LeFevre, 206 F.3d 196 (2d 
Cir. 2000), the court of appeals held that the trial judge "could not 
properly decide the third Batson step" because he "resisted counsel's 
efforts to make arguments regarding the peremptory strikes so as to 
create a full record" and instead "ruled summarily" after "an extremely 
brief colloquy." Id. at 201. Likewise, in Coulter v. Gilmore, 155 F.3d 912 
(7th Cir. 1998), the court of appeals spent several pages describing the 
bizarre nature of the procedure used by the state trial court in ruling on 
Batson objections. Id. at 915-16, 918. The court of appeals ultimately 
concluded that the state court had not considered the totality of the 
relevant circumstances and thus ordered that the petitioner be released 
if the state court did not conduct a Batson hearing using "the proper 
methodology." Id. at 922. The procedures used by the Delaware courts 
in the present case bear no resemblance to the procedures found 
deficient in Jordan and Coulter. 
 
The majority also cites two appeals in which the Sixth Circuit 
remanded cases for the district courts to provide more complete 
explanations of Batson rulings. See United States v. Harris, 192 F.3d 
580, 588 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hill , 146 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 
1998). These, however, were direct federal appeals, not habeas 
proceedings initiated by state prisoners, and the relief ordered -- 
remands for fuller explanation -- goes far beyond what the majority 
ordered here. 
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The majority confuses the obligation to consider all of the 
relevant evidence (something that a court should always do 
in making findings of fact) with the obligation to comment 
on all of the evidence (an obligation that we are not free to 
impose on state courts). 
 
In this case, as I have noted, there is no question that 
the state courts did precisely what step three of Batson 
required -- they made findings as to whether Riley had 
established purposeful discrimination. And they did so only 
after discovery and a thorough hearing. There is no reason 
to believe that the state courts did not consider all of the 
relevant evidence, including all of the evidence that the 
majority now finds persuasive. The Delaware courts simply 
did not comment on all of this evidence. (Judgments about 
credibility based on a witness's demeanor often do not lend 
themselves to such explanation). But the Delaware courts 
were not obligated to comment on all of the evidence. The 
majority in this case reviews the decisions of the Delaware 
courts as if they were decisions of a Social Security 
administrative law judge, who must, we have held,"give 
some reason for discounting the evidence she rejects." 
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999). The 
Delaware courts, however, are not to be treated as if they 
were federal administrative agencies. 
 
The majority's relief. Even if the majority were correct 
that the Delaware courts were obligated to explain on the 
record why they accepted the prosecution's explanations for 
its strikes and were not persuaded by Riley's evidence, that 
would hardly justify the relief that the majority orders -- 
the granting of the writ unless Riley is re-tried. When a 
decision is found to be faulty for failure to provide an 
adequate explanation, the logical remedy is to remand so 
that an adequate explanation can be supplied. See, e.g., 
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 
(1985); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut., 463 
U.S. 29, 57 (1983). Here, however, the majority does not 
give the Delaware courts a chance to comply with the 
majority's newly found procedural requirements. Nor does 
the majority remand to the District Court for a hearing and 
findings specifically addressing the points that the majority 
views as important. Instead, the majority orders that the 
writ be granted unless Riley is re-tried. 
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How the state courts' failure to address Riley's evidence 
on the record can justify such relief is baffling. If the lack 
of explanations on the record is important to the majority's 
analysis, then the case should be remanded so that 
explanations may be provided. If no explanations on the 
record could satisfy the majority -- and I believe that to be 
the case -- then the majority's lengthy discussion of the 
inadequacy of the Delaware courts' opinions is beside the 
point. 
 
3. The majority's remaining reasons for rejecting the 
hearing judge's finding require little response. The majority 
notes that, although the prosecutor testified that Nichols 
paused, "the record reflects no such pause." Maj. Op. at 16. 
I have read many trial transcripts, and I do not recall any 
in which the court reporter noted that a witness had or had 
not paused before answering a question. 
 
The majority finds it significant that "despite Nichols' 
alleged pause, the prosecutors did not ask the trial court to 
remove Nichols for cause." Maj. Op. at 17. The majority 
raises the question "why if Nichols actually did pause `a 
significant pause,' the state did not seek to have him 
removed for cause." Id. Does the majority seriously believe 
that a prospective juror who pauses before answering a 
question about the death penalty may properly be removed 
for cause? 
 
The majority observes that "[t]he record does not show 
. . . that any of the contemporaneous notes kept by the 
prosecutors as to some of the jurors reflected either the 
existence of a pause or the concern about which[the 
prosecutor] testified six years later." Maj. Op. at 17. The 
prosecutor's notes, however, consist of a handwritten sheet 
with a few words or abbreviations scrawled next to the 
names of some of the prospective jurors. Nichols's name is 
not even on this sheet. The notes by no means record the 
reasons for all of the prosecution's strikes. 
 
I wish there were some scientific test that could 
determine with complete certainty whether Nichols paused 
and whether the prosecutor told the truth. Unfortunately, 
there is no such test. We must rely to a substantial degree 
on the ability of the judge who heard the prosecutor's 
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testimony to make an accurate assessment of his 
credibility. There is no question that the hearing judge took 
his responsibility seriously and made his finding in good 
faith. Our role under the federal habeas statute is to 
determine whether that credibility finding is "fairly 
supported by the record." It is. 
 
C: Charles McGuire. 
 
1. Riley's strongest Batson claim concerns the 
prosecution's strike of Charles McGuire. At trial, the 
prosecutor first used a peremptory challenge against 
McGuire and then immediately made the following 
application to the trial judge: 
 
        [THE PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, may I ask the 
       Court to reconsider charging the State for that strike. 
       This Mr. McGuire came to chambers yesterday and 
       expressed his belief that he didn't know if he could last 
       the two weeks [the estimated length of the trial], there 
       was some problem with work. He was an inspector or 
       something for the Department of Labor. I know he 
       came in yesterday. 
 
        THE COURT: I will not strike him for cause for that 
       reason. He asked to be excused yesterday and I 
       decided not to excuse him. 
 
App. 250. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing held before the hearing judge, 
the prosecutor testified that he struck McGuire because 
McGuire "had previously requested to be excused from jury 
service" and because the prosecutor "wanted attentive 
jurors" who were not worried about missing other 
obligations or activities while the trial took place. App. 801. 
 
The defense called McGuire as a witness at the 
evidentiary hearing. McGuire testified that he was employed 
by the State of Delaware as a Social Security "disability 
adjudicator," App. 846-47; that he had been reporting for 
jury duty in the courthouse in Dover for two to three weeks 
before he was questioned in connection with the Riley case 
but had not been seated on a jury, id. at 852-53; that while 
he was away from work, the disability claims assigned to 
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him would "just sit[ ]," id. at 850; that the director of his 
office had told him that he was going to make a"formal 
request" that McGuire be excused, id. at 860; that such a 
request was sent, id. at 853, 856; and that the request had 
been discussed in chambers with the judge. Id . at 849-50, 
856. McGuire said, however, that he himself had never 
expressed an unwillingness to serve on the jury and had 
been willing to do so. See id. at 850. 
 
The hearing judge accepted the prosecutor's explanation 
of the reason for striking McGuire. The hearing judge 
found: 
 
       The State peremptorily challenged Charles McGuire 
       because [the prosecutor] believed he requested to be 
       excused from jury duty and, therefore, may have been 
       unable or unwilling to serve for the entirety of the trial. 
       . . . McGuire's employer sent a letter requesting he be 
       released from jury duty because he could not be 
       replaced at his job if he was chosen for jury duty. The 
       letter by McGuire's employer clearly gave the State 
       reason to question whether McGuire would give his full 
       time and attention to the trial and whether he would 
       be able to serve for the entirety of the time projected for 
       the trial. Whether McGuire, in fact, did not request 
       relief from jury duty and did wish to serve is of no 
       consequence. 
 
Riley v. State, No. 200, 1988 at 4-5 (emphasis added). The 
hearing judge then noted that the state's explanation for 
striking McGuire, was "entirely unrelated to the juror's 
race," and the judge credited that explanation. Id. at 5. 
Obviously, by crediting an explanation that was"entirely 
unrelated to the juror's race," the hearing judge necessarily 
found that Riley had not "established purposeful 
discrimination," Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, and the hearing 
judge thus fully complied with Batson's step three.6 
 
Several factors provide substantial support for this 
finding. It is apparent that McGuire's work situation was on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The majority, however, incorrectly suggests (Maj. Op. at 33) that 
finding "the prosecutor to be credible" is different from finding that 
purposeful discrimination was not proved. 
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the prosecutor's mind when McGuire was peremptorily 
challenged because, as noted, immediately after striking 
McGuire, the prosecutor asked that McGuire's dismissal be 
deemed for cause since he had "expressed his belief that he 
didn't know if he could last the two weeks." App. 250. In 
addition, a reasonable prosecutor might well have wondered 
whether McGuire's work situation would adversely affect 
his attentiveness at trial. As noted, McGuire's supervisor 
had made a "formal request" that he be excused"because 
he could not be replaced at his job if he was chosen for jury 
duty."7 Whether or not McGuire himself in fact wished to 
serve on the jury, the impression apparently was conveyed 
that McGuire wanted to be excused and to return to work, 
since the trial judge commented: "He asked to be excused 
yesterday and I decided not to excuse him." See App. 250. 
Under these circumstances, a reasonable prosecutor could 
have been concerned that McGuire might have been 
inattentive at trial due to worry about missing work, leaving 
his duties unattended, and perhaps incurring his 
supervisor's displeasure. 
 
Riley attacks the hearing judge's finding on two grounds. 
First, he points out that, according to McGuire's testimony 
at the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing, McGuire 
himself did not ask to be excused. This argument is 
unpersuasive. Although McGuire testified that he did not 
ask to be excused, the trial judge, as noted, stated at the 
time of McGuire's dismissal: "He asked to be excused 
yesterday and I decided not to excuse him." App. 250 
(emphasis added). Thus, McGuire, who was unable to 
remember many details at the time of the post-conviction 
relief evidentiary hearing, see id. at 853, 857-62, may have 
been mistaken, or he may have conveyed the impression at 
the time of trial that he personally wanted to be excused. 
 
Second, Riley points out that the handwritten sheet 
prepared by the prosecutors during voir dire contains the 
following notation next to the name of a white juror, 
Charles Reed, whom the prosecution did not peremptorily 
strike: "works Lowe's -- wants off." One of the prosecutors 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Riley v. State, No. 200, 1988 at 4. See also App. 860 (McGuire's 
testimony at the evidentiary hearing). 
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was questioned about this notation by Riley's attorney at 
the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing, but the 
prosecutor testified that he had no recollection of Reed. See 
App. 823-24. 
 
The notation by Reed's name and the prosecutor's 
testimony at the evidentiary hearing are certainly factors 
that the hearing judge could have viewed as tending to 
undermine the credibility of the prosecutor's explanation for 
striking McGuire, but the notation and the prosecutor's 
testimony are insufficient to show that the hearing judge's 
finding is not "fairly supported by the record." 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(d). It is reasonable to infer from the notation "wants 
off " that, at some point in the jury selection process, Reed 
expressed a desire to be excused for some reason. As far as 
I am aware, however, the record does not establish why8 or 
how strongly Reed wanted to be excused. The transcript of 
the voir dire shows that, at the final stage of the jury 
selection process, the members of the venire were asked 
whether there was "any reason why [they] absolutely [could 
not] serve," App. 223; that members of the venire then 
successfully asked to be released for reasons such as a 
previously planned vacation, id. at 253; but that Reed made 
no request to be excused at that time. See id . at 229-30. 
Thus, as far as the record appears to reveal, Reed may have 
had a relatively weak desire and reason to be excused, and 
his situation may not have been at all comparable in this 
respect to McGuire's.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Although the notation "wants off " appears after the words "works at 
Lowe's," it is not clear that Reed's desire to be excused was related to 
his 
employment. The prosecutor's notes appear to contain notations of the 
employment of other jurors. 
 
9. Many decisions have held that Batson is not contravened simply 
because two jurors exhibit similar characteristics and one is excluded 
while the other is retained. See, e.g., Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 
918 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Spriggs , 102 F.3d 1245, 1255 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 926 (11th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Alvarado, 951 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1991); United States 
v. Lance, 853 F.2d 1177, 1181 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. McCoy, 
848 F.2d 743, 745 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Lewis, 837 F.2d 415, 
417 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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As I have noted, our scope of review of the hearing 
judge's finding is narrow. Although it would be satisfying to 
know why Reed was not stricken, that unanswered 
question is not enough, in view of the "great deference"10 
owed the hearing judge's credibility determination, to 
demonstrate that the hearing judge's finding is not"fairly 
supported by the record."11 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(8) (1988 & 
Supp. 1990). 
 
In an effort to bolster its unusual decision to overturn the 
hearing judge's credibility finding, the majority points to a 
statement contained in the brief filed by the state in Riley's 
direct appeal. The majority writes: 
 
       When Riley's direct appeal came before the Delaware 
       Supreme Court in 1984, the State justified the use of 
       race in selecting jurors in criminal trials. On that 
       occasion, which was the State's first opportunity to 
       defend the use of its peremptory challenges in Riley's 
       trial, the State did not offer a single race-neutral 
       explanation, not even as an alternate argument; 
       instead, it claimed that it was permissible -- even 
       socially desirable -- to exclude jurors based on what it 
       called `group association.' " 
 
Maj. Op. at 25 (quoting App. 896). 
 
This argument is not well taken. Responding to Riley's 
suggestion that the Delaware Supreme Court should 
hold that individual race-based peremptories were 
unconstitutional, the state's brief argued as follows: 
 
       Because the Sixth Amendment does not support 
       [Riley's argument] and the decision in Swain v. 
       Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), more appropriately 
       recognizes how peremptory challenges, even those 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21. 
 
11. This case is very different from Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960 (1993). 
There, exercising plenary review in the absence of any findings of fact by 
a state court, we held that Batson was violated where the prosecutor 
excluded a black juror who had a child approximately the same age as 
the defendant, while retaining a white juror who was similarly situated. 
Jones, 987 F.2d at 973. In the present case, we are limited to deciding 
whether the state court finding is fairly supported by the evidence. 
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       exercised on the basis of group association, foster the 
       constitutional goal of an impartial jury, the state 
       asserts that no reversal is required here. 
 
App. 896-97 (footnotes omitted). Thus, the state's brief -- 
which the lead trial prosecutor did not even sign-- merely 
urged the state supreme court to follow the reasoning of the 
United States Supreme Court in what was then the 
governing federal precedent. It is far-fetched to interpret the 
state's reliance on Swain as a tacit admission that its 
peremptories in this case were based on race -- particularly 
since, in a footnote to the sentence quoted above, the state 
was careful to deny that its challenges were racially based.12 
 
It is also unreasonable to draw an adverse inference 
against the state for not providing race-neutral 
explanations for its challenges in its appellate brief. Since 
there was no evidence in the record regarding the reasons 
for the strikes, the state could hardly have expected the 
state supreme court to base a decision on explanations 
provided without record support. The majority's arguments 
regarding the state's brief are insubstantial. 
 
The majority's reliance on statistical evidence is even 
worse. In the Batson proceeding before the hearing judge, 
Riley made a proffer that no African American had served 
on any of the three other first-degree murder trials that had 
occurred in Kent County within a year of his own and that 
in those cases the prosecution had peremptorily challenged 
five African Americans. The three other trials were those of 
Andre Deputy, an African American, and two whites, Daniel 
Pregent, who was acquitted, and Judith McBride, who was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The state's brief stated that it "emphatically denie[d] that the 
prosecutor exercised any of his challenges solely on the assumption that 
the juror's race, in the context of the facts of this case, indicated a 
verdict position adverse to the prosecution." App. 896. The majority 
seizes on the word "solely" in this sentence as a tacit admission that 
race 
played a part in the decision to exercise peremptories. In my view, it is 
wholly unreasonable to read that much into the word"solely." The 
Supreme Court in Batson itself used this same word in the same 
context. See 476 U.S. at 89 (emphasis added)("[T]he Equal Protection 
Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on 
account of their race."). 
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convicted. With respect to these cases, no information was 
provided at the time -- and none has been provided since 
-- about the identities of the prosecutors who participated 
in jury selection, the racial makeup of the venire, or the 
race of jurors who were dismissed for cause or peremptorily 
challenged by the defense. 
 
In the trial of Andre Deputy, who was convicted and 
ultimately executed, the state struck four whites, one 
African American, and one person listed as "Indian." 
Deputy argued that the prosecution's peremptory challenge 
of the African American venireperson violated Batson. See 
Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1492 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Deputy's Batson argument was rejected in the district court 
decision denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 
and our court affirmed. See id. at 1492. Since it has been 
held that no Batson violation was shown in Deputy, it is 
difficult to see how that case can be viewed as supporting 
Riley's argument here. 
 
In Pregent's case, the state struck four whites and one 
black. There is nothing before us to indicate that any 
Batson objection was made, and it is doubtful that the 
pattern of strikes exercised by the prosecution sufficed to 
make out a prima facie case. 
 
The remaining case is the prosecution of Judith McBride 
for murdering her husband. See McBride v. State , 477 A.2d 
174 (Del. 1984). The state exercised a total of 10 strikes, of 
which three were against potential jurors identified as black.13 
There is nothing to indicate that any Batson objection was 
made. Without in effect holding a Batson hearing, there is 
no way of determining whether any prosecution 
peremptories were based on race. 
 
Although Riley was represented at the Batson hearing by 
a professor of law and has been represented in the federal 
habeas proceeding by attorneys from one of the nation's 
leading law firms, no expert analysis of these statistics has 
ever been offered.14 According to the majority, however, the 
"sophisticated analysis of a statistician" is not needed to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. According to Riley's statistics, five of those struck by the state 
were 
white, and the race of two is not provided. 
14. The majority's statement that "the procedural posture of the case" 
provided "no opportunity" for Riley to offer an expert analysis of his 
statistics (Maj. Op. at 38) is difficult to understand. What stopped Riley 
from offering the evidence of a statistician as to the significance of the 
scant statistics that Riley provided? 
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interpret the significance of these statistics. Maj. Op. at 19. 
"An amateur with a pocket calculator," the majority writes, 
can calculate that "there is little chance of randomly 
selecting four consecutive all white juries." Id. 
 
Statistics can be very revealing -- and also terribly 
misleading in the hands of "an amateur with a pocket 
calculator." The majority's simplistic analysis treats the 
prospective jurors who were peremptorily challenged as if 
they had no relevant characteristics other than race, as if 
they were in effect black and white marbles in a jar from 
which the lawyers drew. In reality, however, these 
individuals had many other characteristics, and without 
taking those variables into account, it is simply not possible 
to determine whether the prosecution's strikes were based 
on race or something else. 
 
The dangers in the majority's approach can be easily 
illustrated. Suppose we asked our "amateur with a pocket 
calculator" whether the American people take right- or left- 
handedness into account in choosing their Presidents. 
Although only about 10% of the population is left-handed, 
left-handers have won five of the last six presidential 
elections.15 Our "amateur with a calculator" would conclude 
that "there is little chance of randomly selecting" left- 
handers in five out of six presidential elections. But does it 
follow that the voters cast their ballots based on whether a 
candidate was right- or left-handed? 
 
Whether even a careful multiple-regression analysis of 
peremptory challenge statistics in other cases would suffice 
to show that a Batson violation occurred in this case is 
unclear. Cf. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). Here, 
however, we have not been presented with any expert 
statistical evidence. 
 
The majority and the concurrence argue that an adverse 
inference should be drawn against the state for failing to 
come forward with data to rebut Riley's statistics. I see no 
basis for this approach. Whether an adverse inference 
should be drawn under particular circumstances based on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. See "Forget Left-Wing. Say Hello to Left-Handed Politics," New York 
Times, Jan. 23, 2000. 
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a party's failure to produce evidence in a state proceeding 
is in the first instance a question of state law, and unless 
a state court's failure to draw such an inference in a 
particular case denies due process or a fair and adequate 
hearing, a federal habeas court should be reluctant to 
reject the state court's ruling. Cf. 28 U.S.C. S 2254 (6) and 
(7) (1988 & Supp. 1990) (amended 1996). Moreover, even if 
this were a collateral attack on a federal conviction, we 
would defer to the decision of the judge who conducted the 
hearing as to whether the circumstances justified the 
drawing of adverse inference and would reverse only if the 
judge committed an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Bouzo v. 
Citibank, N.A., 96 F.3d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 
Here, the state courts' failure to draw such an inference 
certainly did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The 
state was never given notice that it had any obligation to 
provide additional data, and it is not at all clear what sort 
of evidence the majority expects the state to have provided. 
The information that is most critically lacking-- the 
prosecutors' reasons for striking the five African American 
venire members in the Deputy, McBride, and Pregent cases 
-- probably could not have been obtained without in effect 
conducting retrospective Batson hearings in those cases. 
Does the majority think that such a hearing would have 
been practical? Or does the majority think that the state 
should have retained am expert to analyze the state's use 
of peremptory challenges in some other set of cases? In 
order to make such an analysis, the expert probably would 
have needed detailed information about the prospective 
jurors whom the state did and did not strike -- e.g., their 
ages, marital status, education, occupations, and past 
experiences with law enforcement, to name just a few of the 
myriad variables that often figure in decisions about 
peremptory challenges. We have no indication that such 
information was available, and in any event, compiling and 
analyzing the data concerning a reasonable sample of cases 
could have been a massive undertaking. In my view, it is 
entirely unwarranted to hold that the state courts abused 
their discretion because they did not draw adverse 
inferences from the state's failure to volunteer to conduct 
such a study in response to the statistics that Riley 
proffered. 
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In sum, I see no ground for overturning the hearing 
judge's credibility findings. I would thus hold that the 
presumption of correctness has not been overcome and 
would reject Riley's Batson argument. The majority -- by in 
effect making its own credibility findings on the cold state 
court record -- seriously errs. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 
459 U.S. at 434. 
 
II. 
 
I now turn to the majority's holding that a remark made 
by the prosecutor in closing argument at the penalty phase 
of the trial violated Caldwell v. Mississippi , supra. In 
Caldwell, the defense attorney's closing argument asked the 
jury to "confront both the gravity and responsibility of 
calling for another's death." 472 U.S. at 324. In response, 
the prosecutor took strong exception to the defense 
attorney's comments and stated: 
 
       Now, they would have you believe that you're going to 
       kill this man and they know -- they know that your 
       decision is not the final decision. My God, how unfair 
       can you be? Your job is reviewable. They know it. . . . 
       For they know, as I know, and as [the judge] has told 
       you, that the decision you render is automatically 
       reviewable by the Supreme Court. 
 
Id. at 325-26. 
 
By a vote of five to three, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed the defendant's death sentence. The 
plurality opinion approved by four justices concluded that 
the prosecutor's comments were improper for two reasons: 
first, because the prosecutor's description of the state 
scheme of appellate review was not "accurate" and, second, 
because the availability of appellate review was"wholly 
irrelevant to the determination of the appropriate sentence." 
Id. 
 
Justice O'Connor, who cast the deciding fifth vote for 
reversal, refused to endorse the principle that"the giving of 
nonmisleading and accurate information regarding the 
jury's role in the sentencing scheme is irrelevant to the 
sentencing decision." 472 U.S. at 341 (opinion of O'Connor, 
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J.) (emphasis added). However, she agreed that the 
prosecutor's statements were improper because they 
"creat[ed] the mistaken impression that automatic appellate 
review of the jury's sentence would provide the 
authoritative determination of whether death was 
appropriate," whereas in fact the state supreme court 
exercised only a narrow scope of review. Id. 
 
In subsequent cases, the Court has clarified the holding 
in Caldwell. In Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9 (1994), 
the Court wrote as follows: 
 
       As Justice O'CONNOR supplied the fifth vote in 
       Caldwell, and concurred on grounds narrower than 
       those put forth by the plurality, her position is 
       controlling. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 
       193 (1977) . . . . Accordingly, we have since read 
       Caldwell as "relevant only to certain types of comment 
       --those that mislead the jury as to its role in the 
       sentencing process in a way that allows the jury to feel 
       less responsible than it should for the sentencing 
       decision." Durden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184, 
       n.15 (1986). Thus, "[t]o establish a Caldwell violation, 
       a defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to 
       the jury improperly described the role assigned to the 
       jury by local law." Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407 
       (1989), see also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 233 
       (1990). 
 
The Romano Court rejected the Caldwell  argument 
advanced in that case because "the jury was not 
affirmatively misled regarding its role in the sentencing 
process." Id. at 10. 
 
Riley's argument is based on a statement made by the 
prosecutor near the very beginning of his summation at the 
sentencing phase of the trial. The prosecutor stated: 
 
       As the Judge has explained to you we have a specific 
       statute with regard to what occurred in a penalty 
       hearing on a capital case. 
 
       Let me say at the outset that what you do today is 
       automatically reviewed by our Supreme Court and that 
       is why there is an automatic review on the death 
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       penalty. That is why, if you return a decision of death, 
       that is why you will receive and have to fill out a two- 
       page interrogatory that the Court will give you. This is 
       an interrogatory that specifically sets out the questions 
       that the State request and whether or not you believe 
       it beyond a reasonable doubt and if you want in your 
       determination, if you believe the sentence should be 
       death then each and every one of you has to sign this. 
       This goes to the Supreme Court. That is why it is 
       concise and we believe clear and it should be looked 
       carefully on and answered appropriately. 
 
App. 393 (emphasis added). Riley argues that the 
highlighted words quoted above violated Caldwell . 
 
In its decision on direct appeal, the Delaware Supreme 
Court responded to this argument as follows: 
 
       [T]he prosecutor's remarks in no way suggested that 
       responsibility for ultimately determining whether 
       defendant faced life imprisonment or death rested 
       elsewhere. The prosecutor's passing comment to the 
       jury that its decision would be "automatically reviewed" 
       was fairly made in the context of the prosecutor's 
       preceding reference to the "specific statute[controlling] 
       a penalty hearing on a capital case." 11 Del.C.S 4209. 
       Since subsection (g) of S 4209 mandates the"Automatic 
       Review of Death Penalty by Delaware Supreme Court", 
       the prosecutor in the instant case was simply quoting 
       the statute. In no sense may it reasonably be said that 
       the prosecutor was either misstating the law, 
       misleading the jury as to its role, or minimizing its 
       sentencing responsibility. 
 
496 A.2d at 1025 (alteration in original). I agree with this 
analysis. 
 
The prosecutor's remarks in Caldwell were"quite 
focused, unambiguous, and strong." 472 U.S. at 340. The 
clear message was that, contrary to the suggestion of 
defense counsel that the jury should "confront both the 
gravity and responsibility of calling for another's death," id. 
at 324, the jury need not shoulder that responsibility 
because "the authoritative determination of whether death 
was appropriate" would be made by the state supreme 
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court. Id. at 343 (Opinion of O'Connor, J.). It was in this 
sense that the remarks " `improperly described the role 
assigned to the jury by local law' "16 and thus " `allowed the 
jury to feel less responsible than it should for the 
sentencing decision.' "17 
 
The prosecutor's remarks in this case were very different. 
Here, the prosecutor made accurate, unemotional, passing 
remarks in the context of describing the state statute and 
explaining why the jury would have to "fill out a two-page 
interrogatory" if it returned a capital sentence. These 
remarks did not convey the message that the jury should 
not confront the gravity of returning a death verdict, and 
thus the mere mention of the fact that there would be an 
automatic appeal to the state supreme court did not 
mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing process. In 
this connection, it is noteworthy that after the closing 
arguments, the trial judge instructed the jury on its role 
using language that left no doubt about its responsibility. 
The trial judge stated: "Where the jury submits such a 
finding and recommendation, the Court shall sentence the 
defendant to death." See 585 A.2d at 731 (emphasis added). 
A "recommendation of death, supported by the evidence, 
shall be binding on the Court." Id. (emphasis added). "Your 
unanimous recommendation for the imposition of the death 
penalty, if supported by the evidence, is binding on the 
Court." Id. at 734 (emphasis added). In light of the 
substantial factual differences between Caldwell  and this 
case, and in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent 
explanation of the meaning of Caldwell, I would reject 
Riley's Caldwell claim. 
 
The majority appears to hold that a Caldwell violation 
occurred simply because the prosecutor accurately stated 
that there would be an automatic appeal to the state 
supreme court without attempting to explain the scope of 
review that the state supreme court would exercise. I do not 
agree with this reading of Caldwell. Neither Justice 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. at 9 (quoting Dugger v. Adams, 489 
U.S. at 407). 
 
17. Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. at 9 (quoting Durden v. Wainwright, 
477 U.S. at 184, n.15). 
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O'Connor's controlling opinion in Caldwell nor the Court's 
subsequent explanation in Romano took the position that 
an unadorned reference to automatic judicial review of a 
capital verdict is enough to violate the Constitution. And 
such a holding would make little sense. As the Seventh 
Circuit has noted: 
 
       Everyone knows that after a death sentence is 
       imposed, there are tiers of appellate review designed to 
       catch errors; the prosecutor wasn't telling the jurors 
       anything they didn't know already. Appellate review is 
       a fact of almost all criminal cases that are tried. 
       Knowledge of this does not cause jurors to take lightly 
       their sentencing responsibilities. 
 
Fleenor v. Anderson, 171 F.3d 1096, 1098 (7th Cir. 1999). 
What Caldwell forbids is not a simple reference to 
automatic appellate review, but the suggestion that the 
scope of review is broader than it is in fact. The remarks in 
Caldwell conveyed such a suggestion; the comments here 
did not. I would therefore hold that no Caldwell  violation 
occurred. 
 
III. 
 
Reviewing habeas decisions in capital cases is one of the 
most important and difficult responsibilities of this court. 
Our role is vital -- but limited -- and is not to be confused 
with that of the jury or the various branches of state 
government. Applying the legal standards that are 
applicable to us in the present context, I believe that the 
decision of the district court must be affirmed. 
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